On July 30, 1942, National Defence Headquarters had to write an uncomfortable letter to Washington, D.C. The Second World War equivalent of cyberbullying that the Americans received had Canadian origins and was being dealt with accordingly.

Canadian Colonel Stratton asked the Americans who was jamming a Japanese line. The answer: a Siberian station. What can we learn about Second World War signals cooperation from this exchange?

In June 1942, S. G. Lawrence, a Great War veteran of the “Canadian Corp wireless”, wrote to the Officer Commanding Military Signals in Halifax about a strange series of intercepts. What became of the query?

Family matters – what did Canadian wartime radio monitoring make of a suspicious message signed “ALL WELL LOVE MOTHER”?

1952, Canadian Immigration requested updated policy on the admission or denial of entry into Canada of former Nazis, fascists, and collaborators. How did the Security Panel develop their recommendations?

December 3, 1941. Canadian intelligence intercepted a message from Rio de Janeiro being transmitted to Hamburg. The intercept described US ship locations. By December 8 it was forwarded to the Americans. Follow the link to learn more about CA-US WWII SIGINT cooperation.

The Canadian embassy in Bonn was rightfully concerned when members of the militant Baader-Meinhof gang were apprehended with firearms previously owned by the Canadian government. How did the gang get them?

“Futile and somewhat ridiculous statements.” – Another strange intercept makes its way to the desk of Captain Drake. Repeated transmissions were intercepted by Canadians from the US to Germany, including one sent the day these countries declared war on one another!

Please fill out these forms to go to war. War Books detailed a list of “measures that will probably have to be taken” in the event of the outbreak of war. How have these books changed over the decades?

In the spring of 1941, an intercepted cable indicated the Swiss General Consulate in Montréal would be tuning in to a broadcast from Shwarzenberg, Switzerland. Canadian military intelligence decided they would tune in as well!

The Canadian Government considered varying degrees of involvement in the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Key considerations included the positions of other allies and threats to Canadian national security.

February 1941. Capt. Drake received a radiogram that was intercepted by the Radio Station in Fort Simpson, Northwest Territories. It appeared to be Romanized Russian and originated from a station in the Arctic of the USSR. Why send Romanized messages in the clear?

Valentine’s Day 1941, Capt. Drake sent a telegram to M.I.8. The Canadians had intercepted a “suspicious” German transmission. It contained 221 3-letter groups, 180 5-letter groups, and a half page of text from Hitler’s manifesto. What could this possibly mean?

Are you interested in researching Canadian involvement in the War on Terror? The Operation APOLLO files are an excellent research resource. They contain official and logistics documents, communications, and reports elaborating on the impacts of Canadian operations.

What did the Canadian Signals Corps do with mysterious wireless intercepts? What was protocol when messages could not be deciphered? A strange weather report intercepted in New Brunswick was forwarded to Captain Edward Michael Drake, and from this we get a glimpse into the exploitation process.

“They have everything that any soldier can possibly want: an assortment of guns, hip flasks, poker dice, signed photos of Rita Hayworth, pocketfuls of french letters and occupation money.” – N. Lewis, Naples ’44. Who were these Canadian soldiers?

October 22nd 1940, Canadian Signals exploited a telegram from Mexican President Cárdenas to Maréchal Pétain in Vichy France requesting the extradition of Señor Nicolau d’Olwer from Gestapo custody. Who was d’Owler, and why was he being detained by the Gestapo?

Fall 1940, Canadian Military Intelligence shared intercepted Japanese transmissions with the Dept. of External Affairs. The Japanese telegrams speculated that the US was not prepared “mentally or practically” for war, and correctly anticipated America’s economic assistance strategy with its allies.

In 1960 Canadian diplomat Jim Nutt visited Cape Canaveral alongside several NATO representatives. An Atlas missile launch was intended to reassure America’s NATO allies of its nuclear might, but for Jim Nutt, it inspired a sobering reflection.

June 1966, after Ronning left Hanoi, the US bombed oil facilities in Hanoi and Haiphong. Had the failure of the Ronning mission influenced American escalation, or had it been used as justification for decision that had already been made?

1955, “The Lobster Festival” was a Department of External Affairs/CBC-IS Cold War cooperative radio propaganda operation. Canadian “Kremlinologists” sought to leverage a perceived rift within the Soviet leadership concerning its relationship with communist China.

June 1966, Ronning returns to Hanoi, but Canadian officials worry they will be perceived as “a mouthpiece to American propaganda.” The N. Vietnamese view remained steadfast, stop the bombing “permanently and unconditionally”. The New York Times ran an article on the mission’s lack of success.

Enter Chester Ronning, codenamed “Smallbridge.” When a China visit evaporated, the operation pivoted to Hanoi. There typical N. Vietnamese rhetoric ensued, but also gave a hint: stop the bombing and peace talks may become possible. “Hard cards to play” in Washington, but Ottawa had more plans.

With the collapse of Bacon, in the winter of 1965 Canada reconsidered its position in the ICC. Americanization of the war in Vietnam was well underway. Ottawa pivoted, could the commission be repurposed? The Ronning missions were beginning to take shape.

October 1965, Operation Bacon was concluded. During Seaborn’s final visit to Hanoi his North Vietnamese counterpart “gave nothing away, apart from the usual diatribe.” Ottawa’s verdict? The “charcuterie exercise” was done, yet Canada’s role as an ICC member remained significant.

June 1965, a newspaper headline read "LBJ's man in Vietnam Really a Top Canadian", Op. Bacon may have been burned. Beyond the operation’s confidentiality breach, there was considerable concern that Bacon was “exacerbating DRVN antagonism to the USA and annoyance with Canada”.

A Canadian intelligence officer, diplomat, and historian of Japan, Herbert Norman was posted to US counterintelligence in postwar Tokyo. Norman was tasked with monitoring Japanese patriotic societies and their members to identify possible future confidential informants or inside assets.

In early 1965, Seaborn’s fourth mission to Hanoi during Operation Bacon faced serious challenges. Washington’s “non substantive” message to Hanoi coupled with ongoing airstrike Operations Flaming Dart and Rolling Thunder threatened the viability of Bacon.

Oleg Gordievsky’s exfiltration from the USSR was a daring and dangerous endeavor. Codenamed OVATION during his debriefing in England, the former KGB officer provided incredibly detailed and top-secret information. What did Canada learn in the OVATION files, and what can we learn from them now?

Political posturing decisions delayed Seaborn’s third visit to Hanoi. American intervention was increasing, and Canadian officials were facing issues of opinion within the ICC. The balancing act was becoming increasingly difficult to manage.