Chris Sanders 🔎 🧠

@chrissanders88.bsky.social

Digital Forensic Analyst, Researcher, Author Ed.D. Founder Applied Network Defense and Rural Tech Fund Former Mandiant, InGuardians, DoD Author: Intrusion Detection Honeypots, Practical Packet Analysis, Applied NSM

This may be a hot take, but a senior title should recognize someone who consistently applies broad experience, sound judgment, and nuanced perspective across a wide range of situations... not just someone who possesses a rare or in-demand technical skill at the time.

Investigation Scenario 🔎 Alert: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint: Behavior:Win32/SuspClickFix.F detected on a Windows 11 workstation. No additional context is provided. What artifacts would you examine first to determine whether the user executed the ClickFix command?

Call it what you like, but this is a rural tax from USPS. People in rural communities already have fewer local shopping options and rely more heavily on mail delivery. Making lightweight packages more expensive to send there seems antithetical to the idea of this public service.

New USPS rates increase shipping costs for packages under 1 pound to rural areas, affecting delivery logistics for those communities.

Investigation Scenario 🔎 A Windows 11 workstation’s Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational log contains Event ID 106, indicating a new scheduled task named "OneDrive Update Service" was registered at 5:45 PM local time. The user insists they were away from the computer when this happened.

You always want to take the smallest slice of data necessary to answer an investigative question you're asking. It forces you to be focused and specific, while also limiting data processing time and resource utilization on your tools. I preach this frequently to my Investigation Theory students.

Investigation Scenario 🔎 You’ve found ~/.config/systemd/user/dbus-update.service enabled for a user account on an Ubuntu system. The service executes ~/.local/bin/dbus-update, an ELF binary that isn’t owned by any installed package.

One thing I wish I could relay more to learners and teachers alike... The better you know a subject, the harder it is to imagine what it is like for someone else not to know it. That's a curse of knowledge. It's hard to remember what it was like when you didn't know that thing.

Investigation Scenario 🔎 An LLM has reviewed domain authentication logs and suggested that an account is likely compromised, based on several successful authentication clusters that occurred frequently over the past week. What do you look for to investigate whether an incident occurred?

Investigation Scenario 🔎 While hunting, you identify an outlier host with a Windows Prefetch file named RUNDLL32.EXE-3F2A9B1C[.]pf The file shows a run count significantly higher than the baseline observed across the environment, with multiple recorded execution timestamps occurring overnight.

Most highly effective analysts don't just read logs; they mentally map out the network and visualize the attack as physical movement. They conceptualize functional boundaries and the attack surface available at any given foothold (even if they don't realize they're doing it).

Investigation Scenario 🔎 An employee's Android phone recently made multiple connections to an IP address associated with prior malicious activity. The /data/system/packages.xml file shows a recently installed APK named com[.]secure.update, signed with an unknown cert.

Abstraction simplifies complex data so we can process it quickly, but it also hides data and creates blind spots. We do this with domain names, timestamps, and all sorts of other fields. If your tool automatically drops certain fields or trims logs, you might be missing the full story

Investigation Scenario 🔎 A host on your network downloaded a file with this SHA256 hash: 9297af5f66486d11540f15b44d4b6beec6ff89dbc4dcdee898db9a7daaa76085 What do you look for to investigate whether the malware infected the host? You can only make two queries -- make them count.