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glykosymoritis

@glyko.bsky.social

A political diary: For a democratic secular masterless and borderless world; for individual and social autonomy*; for lifelong democratic civic education with democratic aim, the creation of participatory democratic citizenry. (Castoriadis*) #glykoreads

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glykosymoritis@glyko.bsky.social · 21h ago

Iran’s hidden war room in Iraq: how Houthis and militias are building a new launchpad against Israel. From a fortified enclave in Babil, Yemeni drone experts and Iraqi factions are merging under Iranian direction — shortening the flight path to Israeli cities and rewriting the threat map.

While Israel's defense establishment remains understandably fixed on the northern border, Gaza, and Syria, a quieter and more dangerous shift is unfolding a thousand kilometers to the east. The Houthis of Yemen and Iran's militia network in Iraq are no longer separate problems. They are becoming one. What began as political coordination and mutual declarations of solidarity has hardened into something more concrete: a joint operational presence on Iraqi soil, centered in the fortified militia stronghold of Jurf al-Sakhar in Babil province. This is not a symbolic office in Baghdad or a temporary media outpost. According to detailed regional reporting, including a late-July 2026 investigation by Asharq Al-Awsat and earlier assessments from the Washington Institute, it is a working command node that brings Yemeni drone expertise into the heart of Iran's Iraqi infrastructure and places it within much closer range of Israeli cities.The geography alone should command attention. A long-range drone or cruise missile launched from western or southern Iraq reaches Israeli airspace far faster than one fired from northern Yemen. Early-warning windows shrink. Interception becomes harder. The margin for error narrows for both the Israeli Air Force and the Home Front Command. Iran understands this reality better than most. That is why Houthi specialists are now embedded with Iraqi factions in a place deliberately chosen for its isolation, its dense militia control, and its protection under the umbrella of powerful pro-Iranian groups. Jurf al-Sakhar has long served as a sanctuary for Iran-backed forces. Its distance from central government scrutiny and its access to regional transport corridors make it an ideal environment for covert planning, technical training, and logistical staging. The structure of this presence is not informal. Regional reporting describes a clear division of labor. A senior Houthi representative, Abu Idris al-Sharafi, manages high-level relations with Iraqi militia leaders and the Popular Mobilization Forces. Specialists such as Abu Ali al-Ezzi focus on drone programs, field training, and the transfer of technical expertise gained through years of asymmetric warfare in Yemen. Logistics coordinators, including figures previously active in Damascus, handle supply corridors that link Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Intelligence and operational security remain tightly compartmentalized. Financial channels operate through charitable organizations and commercial fronts in Najaf and other urban centers. Money moves through foundations that present themselves as humanitarian and through businesses that include currency exchange offices, shipping firms, and restaurant chains. Technical knowledge moves through trainers. The result is a hybrid capability that is harder to attribute, harder to disrupt, and harder to deter. This is the point Israel cannot afford to miss. When an attack originates from…The Iraqi government, for its part, has proven unable or unwilling to dismantle these enclaves. Official statements about state sovereignty and pledges to prevent non-state actors from using Iraqi territory for external attacks mean little when fortified areas like Jurf al-Sakhar continue to host foreign operatives and facilitate regional operations. Relying on Baghdad to solve this problem through diplomatic pressure or internal reforms is not a serious strategy. The gap between rhetoric and reality on the ground is too wide. Israel must proceed from the assumption that certain parts of central and western Iraq now function as active operational zones under Iranian strategic direction. Houthi operatives are not only sharing technology and command structures. They are embedding themselves in local networks, including religious and educational circles in places like Najaf. Joint outreach and recruitment efforts through charitable fronts help cultivate a broader base of support and operatives. This social and ideological integration makes the partnership more resilient. It is no longer dependent on a handful of commanders or temporary tactical needs. It is building roots that will be harder for regional intelligence services to uproot. The reality of modern regional security is that localized threats no longer remain isolated. Iran views the Middle East as a single interconnected battlefield. The operational consolidation between Houthi specialists and Iraqi militias in Babil is one more expression of that worldview. Israel's defense posture must adapt accordingly. Treating the eastern flank as a secondary concern simply because it is quieter than the northern border or Gaza would be a strategic error. The flight times are shorter. The attribution problems are real. The financial and logistical networks that sustain the presence are already in place.Addressing this challenge requires a calibrated and sustained response. First, Israeli intelligence must expand its coverage of the commercial and financial channels that fund these networks in Najaf, Baghdad, and the surrounding areas. Exposing the fronts that move money and the businesses that provide cover is essential. Second, military planners must refine attribution models capable of identifying the technical signatures of joint drone and missile cells even when organizational lines are deliberately blurred. Third, strategic messaging toward Tehran, Baghdad, and international partners must be consistent and unambiguous. Geographic proxy ambiguity will not provide immunity. Those who host, train, or facilitate attacks against Israel from any territory should understand that the costs will be real and substantial. State authorities in Baghdad must also be held to account. Allowing sovereign territory to serve as a staging ground for regional aggression cannot continue without consequence. At the same time, Israel must make clear that the presence of foreign strike cells on Iraqi soil will not be treated as an internal Iraqi matter when those cells are directed against Israeli targets. The eastern flank is no longer theoretical. A new launchpad is being assembled under Iranian supervision, closer to Israeli population centers than previous Houthi capabilities allowed. The combination of Yemeni technical experience and Iraqi geographic positioning creates a more flexible and more dangerous threat than either component alone. Ignoring it because it is not yet the loudest front would leave Israel exposed to a surprise that could have been anticipated.
glykosymoritis@glyko.bsky.social · 2d ago

Beijing seems strikingly unaware that its continued success depends on the U.S.-led order. #China has consolidated its control over supply chains & acquired unprecedented leverage over its trade partners. It has also become increasingly brazen in its bid for industrial dominance. archive.ph/uwn3y

glykosymoritis@glyko.bsky.social · 2d ago

The munitions shortfall doesn’t just affect the current war. It also sends a worrisome message to allies around the world: The United States has been caught off guard by the latest evolution of warfare and lacks the armaments-production capacity to adapt quickly. archive.ph/qBlfd

ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES has been the world's preeminent military power for decades, it apparently cannot fight a regional power such as Iran for more than a few months before experiencing an armaments crisis. Since hostilities with Tehran began on February 28, the U.S. has reportedly used up two-thirds of its Patriot missile interceptors, more than a third of its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors, and a third or more of its prewar stock of Tomahawk cruise missiles. The rate of consumption is all the more striking because a shaky cease-fire had halted most fighting for months. Based on recent production patterns, replenishing the supply of weaponry will take several years. Making America's challenge still more daunting is a major shift in war-fighting technology toward cheap, unmanned aerial vehicles. The United States and its allies in the Persian Gulf have been forced to use expensive, advanced air-defense systems-such as Patriot PAC-3 missiles that each cost millions of dollars and have a long production cycle-to shoot down Iranian drones that can be swiftly assembled for about $30,000. The munitions shortfall doesn't just affect the current war. It also sends a worrisome message to allies around the world: The United States has been caught off guard by the latest evolution of warfare and lacks the armaments-production capacity to adapt quickly. Suddenly, relying on American military technology looks far less reliable as a security strategy than it did before President Trump went to war with Iran. And in the long run, governments that counted on the United States to equip their military are going to need a Plan B IN THE SHORT TERM, concerns about diminished weapons stocks are already limiting Washington's strategic options. Because of his advisers' concern about the adequacy of current supplies, Trump has reportedly been hesitant to escalate the war. If the United States decided to send ground forces into Iran on the scale necessary to ke…(Trump and his appointees during his current and previous terms bear only part of the responsibility for the current situation. The fundamental problem has been a bipartisan neglect of America's military-industrial productive base over the past three decades. The United States allowed many of its strategic industries, such as shipbuilding, to wither. Its post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan involved brief invasions followed by years of relatively low-intensity counterinsurgency warfare that, whatever its difficulties, did not require mass stockpiles of munitions. Informed by these experiences, military planners appear to have been operating under the assumption that future wars would be short and containable. If China attacks Taiwan and the United States wants to come to the island democracy's aid, the Pentagon will not be prepared for a protracted war. Unfortunately, the Trump administration has failed to learn from the war in Ukraine. Iran has learned to mass-produce cheap drones -ones that the Russians first imported and now produce themselves. In other words, their effectiveness had been tested, and their existence was widely known. But that seemed to make no difference to U.S. planners. Perhaps in the arrogant belief that a war with Iran would quickly end in a decisive victory, the Pentagon did not have cost-effective systems ready to intercept these weapons. Neither did the Gulf countries that have counted on American weaponry for their self-defense. In contrast, Ukraine has proved remarkably adaptive to emerging conditions. Creating a powerful strategic industry, as Ukraine has done in the case of air, land, and sea drones, not only helps with the country's security. It also provides a boost to Ukraine's economic and strategic position, as governments in the Gulf and elsewhere seek to tap its expertise. THE GULF PARTNERS that build their militaries around equipment from the United States do so under the assumption that, in a moment of need, they can get wha…Relying on any other country for weapons is dangerous. Doing so may create a flashy frontline force with some advanced capabilities. But once the purchased equipment is destroyed or worn out, the military that bought it is left with troops trained on equipment that it cannot make and with a military doctrine built around equipment it might never have again. Sometimes allies drag their feet or change their mind. Ukrainians have used American military equipment to great effect, but the unreliability of those supplies-because of President Biden's fear of antagonizing Russia and Trump's usual favoritism toward Vladimir Putin-has hampered their war effort. Since Trump's return to office, traditional European allies have come to recognize from his criticism of NATO that they will need to rely more on their own resources for their security. The current munitions crunch could lead its Gulf partners to the same conclusion. If Saudi Arabia and other customers of the American defense industry start sourcing their military equipment elsewhere, or making it themselves, the United States will lose out. Beyond improving America's military position and diplomatic leverage, arms exports have been a lucrative industry. If the United States appears less powerful and less reliable than it once was and is running through munitions faster than it can produce them, many more countries will follow Ukraine's example. The Pentagon is belatedly ramping up its efforts to develop less expensive self-guided weapons. But those initiatives so far seem inadequate to address the problem that the war with Iran has revealed: a gap between America's military needs and what it is capable of manufacturing quickly and cheaply.
glykosymoritis@glyko.bsky.social · 5d ago

Following Iran’s ballistic missile attack on US troops, Trump should reassess his Iran strategy. While his military & economic strategies have been successful, VP Vance’s ceasefire & memorandum of understanding have failed,leading to a cycle of negotiations and retaliatory strikes. archive.ph/8GNnq

After the Iranian regime's ballistic missile attack on U.S. troops in Jordan, the time has come for President Donald Trump to take a good, hard look at the advice he is getting on Iran - what has worked, what has failed and who is responsible for those successes and failures. Here's what has worked: His military chain of command, led by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Central Command head Adm. Brad Cooper, has delivered stunning success on the battlefield - entombing Iran's nuclear material, destroying more than 85 percent of its defense industrial base, sinking its navy, grounding its air force, decimating its ballistic missile capability, annihilating its conventional military forces and imposing a crippling blockade on its ports. The Treasury Department, led by Secretary Scott Bessent, has turned the screws on Tehran with Operation Economic Fury - a campaign of economic warfare aimed at the regime's financial survival. The CIA, under the leadership of Director John Ratcliffe, has provided exquisite intelligence on Iran's military targets, nuclear program and the decision-making cycle of its leaders. The State Department under Secretary Marco Rubio has skillfully managed complicated regional diplomacy. And, of course, there is Trump himself, who looked at a regime that has been waging war on America for 47 years and decided that he would be the first president to fight back. He has dramatically set back Iran's nuclear program - something no other commander in chief has had the courage to do.What has failed? The ceasefire and memorandum of understanding negotiated by Vice President JD Vance - which have driven Trump into a strategic cul-de-sac of negotiations, Iranian violations and U.S. retaliatory strikes, followed by more negotiations. Case in point: Last weekend, as Trump was on the verge of ordering a resumption of major combat, he was told that the Iranians were desperate for a deal. So he paused to give peace a chance. Result? Iran fired five ballistic missiles at a U.S. military base in Jordan. This cycle has repeated for months. Like Lucy and the football, Trump keeps getting told that this time the Iranians are finally ready to make a deal - only to be set up for failure yet again. Indeed, by elevating a deal as the definition of victory, Vance has given Iran a veto over America's ability to declare victory. All it has to do is refuse to agree - which it is doing. Worse, Vance continues to publicly contradict the president's positions. In a recent interview, he suggested that Trump might simply walk away, declaring, "If [the Iranians] don't comply with the deal, the straits are still open, we've still done incredible damage to their nuclear program, and we can get on with our lives as a country." That is not Trump's position. His position is: They'll comply or they will get blown up. In an interview with podcaster Joe Rogan, Vance warned that if Trump resumed major combat, there would be "94 million desperate people flooding into Europe, flooding into the United States." Really? Large numbers of Iranians are going to get across Trump's secure border? Ninety-four million people is the entire population of Iran. Trump has never taken a resumption of major combat off the table. Why was Vance publicly warning of the dire consequences of the policy option (which Trump in fact nearly ordered just a few days ago? The vice president doesn't get his own foreign policy.As Vance publicly undermines the president, he is trying to dissuade Trump from resuming major combat with straw man arguments. On Rogan's podcast, he declared that those who advocate military action want to "send 150,000 ground troops in order to accomplish a change in a regime" and are being manipulated by Israel to "keep the war going on indefinitely... not toward any objective, but just indefinitely." No serious person is proposing to send 150,000 troops into Iran, and no one is advocating indefinite war. What many are advocating is completing the military plan that was paused in April when the ceasefire took effect - executing the final few weeks of the campaign the U.S.-Israeli combined force was carrying out. That campaign has very clear, defined objectives: eliminate remaining leadership figures; further entomb Iran's nuclear sites; take out Iran's remaining ballistic missile sites; destroy the economic and energy infrastructure that provides the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps with a financial lifeline, as well as key highways, railroads, airports and seaports by which the regime gets financial assistance from bordering countries; and demolish Iran's remaining defense industrial base so it cannot rebuild its destroyed capabilities. That's it. Once these targets have been struck, the president should announce an end to major combat, keep the blockade in place, open the Strait of Hormuz and then provide covert support to the Iranian people to help them undermine and eventually bring down the regime - just as the United States provided covert support to freedom movements across the world during the Cold War that liberated 400 million people without U.S. boots on the ground.
glykosymoritis@glyko.bsky.social · 5d ago

Understanding the risk posed by a vaccine-preventable disease is essential to the success of future public health initiatives. If Americans forget what vaccines fight against, then neither will they understand the importance of maintaining defenses.

glykosymoritis@glyko.bsky.social · 5d ago

What could die with the last person using an iron lung: Vaccines are a blessing. Let’s not forget why. archive.ph/NMQQC #polio #vaccination #health #HistoricalPoliticalMemory

On the morning of her fifth birthday in 1953, Martha Ann Lillard woke to discover she could not lift her head. She had polio. The disease's progressive paralysis left her unable to breathe on her own. She would spend the remainder of her life in and out of an iron lung, a negatively pressurized chamber that supported her breathing. When she died last month at age 78, Lillard was the last American still dependent on the device. In 1955, just two years after Lillard contracted the virus, the first polio vaccine became available, and by 1979, the disease was eliminated in the United States. But when it comes to vaccine-preventable diseases in the U.S., society can be a victim of its own successes. As public health efforts such as vaccines eliminate the suffering caused by a disease, collective memory of the illness fades. Contemporary health information is often gathered from personal networks, the internet and the media, none of which is compelled to cover seemingly obsolete vaccine-preventable diseases, such as rubella, diphtheria and polio. The paucity of accurate information leaves a gap for profiteers, who may sensationalize vaccine skepticism in the hopes of going viral. This has proven especially concerning when supported by the leader of the Department of Health and Human Services, Robert F. Kennedy Jr. Polio, or poliomyelitis, was once a feared childhood viral infection in the U.S., with 58,000 reported cases in 1952. Common symptoms include fever, sore throat, nausea and vomiting. The virus may spread through the bloodstream to the brain stem and spinal cord, where it attacks motor nerves, causing paralysis known as paralytic polio and often called infantile paralysis in children. Polio is still present outside of the U.S., with 52 cases confirmed last year, and most commonly affects children under age 5. Among those paralyzed, up to 10 percent will die once paralysis affects the breathing muscles. The disease is highly contagious: Patients can spread the vir…