Jonathan Basile

@jonothingeb.bsky.social

Postdoc at UofT, 20th C literature and science, viruses, evolutionary theory, deconstruction, libraryofbabel.info. Author: Natural Lection (http://bit.ly/495ZCJD), Virality Vitality (https://sunypress.edu/Books/V/Virality-Vitality)

These are the more practical conclusions: I argue that we arrive at a more robust critique of 'AI', and a more thorough understanding of artistic and linguistic production (from human and machine), when it is not based on intentionalist theories of meaning

The LLM is no more a self-conscious subject than we are, but this removes one commonplace stopgap for critiques of ‘AI’. Its statements can no longer be claimed as meaningless, or its artworks as devoid of aesthetic quality, simply because it lacks the intentions of a subject. Our own language has never depended on our intentions for its meaning (as we can see, machine writing remains legible—so much so that at times it is difficult to distinguish or prove its provenance—even if we may tend to read it differently than human writing, when we know or think we know its origin). A structuralist view might conclude that language, as a system unto itself, not only does not depend on such intentions but is the matrix in which they are generated, that all the effects we attribute to our own subjectivity or initiative are effects of language, misrecognized. Derrida was never satisfied by such notions of the ‘death of the author’:

Rather than oppose citation or iteration to the noniteration of an event, one ought to construct a differential typology of forms of iteration, assuming that such a project is tenable and can result in an exhaustive program, a question I hold in abeyance here. In such a typology, the category of intention will not disappear; it will have its place, but from that place it will no longer be able to govern the entire scene and system of utterance. 
In other words, intention does not disappear from the scene once it is deconstructed—it is just that it, like everything else, is written and read. It cannot govern the meaning of a statement (we argue over presumed intentions or can dispute explicit intention-claims, can dissimulate intentions and even be at odds with ourselves over them, and can see further possibilities of interpretation or reading beyond a given intention, etc.). It follows from deconstruction not that intentions and statements of them are meaningless and not that language or writing univocally masters the scene, creating a meaning of and unto itself that forecloses all others, but that intentions are textual. In other words, we know them by that relay described above, understanding our own through language, the world, and the other. They exist for us or an interlocutor or witness only to the extent that they can be inscribed (implicitly or explicitly), which means that they are not the origin of language or action, but rather a participant in the scene of writing. 

Then, our own ‘intentions’ can be transformed by inserting a novel writing machine into our circuits, and that machine may produce intention-effects just as we do, by displacing those relays, by taking part in the self-exteriority of textuality. That certainly does not mean that we ought to treat the writing of LLMs just as we do writing from other sources (except in the sense that both must be read, one way or another), it only means that the linkage we try to form between text and context is insecure in both cases. 
Nor do we need to seek out our inner light to dismiss the artistic productions of ‘AI’. While it is often said that some form of genius, sympathy, or suffering sets apart human artistry, we should recognize that whatever self-relation we accomplish through art-making (a) necessarily subjects itself to established and iterable art-forms, genres, etc., even or especially when it attempts to exceed their limits, and (b) first comes to itself in a relay with such formulaic art (life imitates art, etc.). Again, it is what we have in common with writing machines that allows us to read them otherwise. Context plays a nonprogrammable role in how we read anything, including an artwork. The stories we can tell about a work and its author, the history and tradition within which we contextualize it, and the environing scene in which we situate it all play some role in how we interpret and relate to the work. This context does not determine or constitute reading any more than intention does (nor is it a simple given what counts as context); context participates in the scene. So, anyone is free to imagine that the products of ‘AI’ emerge from a thinking and feeling computer consciousness that they then relate to in an identificatory fashion (as they would any other artist—but perhaps not exactly so), or to see such works as the lazy detritus of a human machine-user or prompt writer, worthy of no more of the reader’s effort than was put into their creation. even if we share a disdain for the type of poetic or artistic work thus far created with ‘AI’, we should not try to theorize its deficiency by claiming that all automated or programmatic processes are inimical to creativity. As Derrida often wrote, it is necessary to think ‘the event with the machine’.  Invention or the unanticipatable is not only possible as a repetition that changes contexts, but every invention takes place this way. Long before LLMs, we had poets and artists making use of much simpler algorithms, and even before the computer, combinatoric processes were used to bypass the censors of consciousness;  moreover, processes of recontextualization (such as found art or poetry) demonstrate the interrelation of invention and iterability. Even if such artistic practices remain matters of taste, I would argue against dismissing them on the grounds that art ought to emanate from the mystical font of pure creativity; if ‘AI’ art disgusts us today, if there is a truly visceral reaction against it, that is perhaps not because of its reliance on machine or iterability (always already the case), nor because of its uniquely bad aesthetic quality (the average and majority of human composition has been similarly slop-like, but may evoke a different reaction); rather, the context and story surrounding this technology is part of our aesthetic experience. That it is dismantling the economic possibilities for human artists and many others, forced upon us by a capitalist system fundamentally hostile to life and nature, serving as the fun-and-innocent front of an ideological campaign building infrastructure and ideological support for ever more totalitarian forms of surveillance, warfare, and governance, all for the benefit of eminently mediocre man-children (too lacking in taste to even appreciate what they are destroying, except for perhaps a barely conscious resentment), this shapes aesthetic experience in a manner that a theory of intentionalism can only obscure.
Jonathan Basile@jonothingeb.bsky.social · 2mo ago

I wrote an essay exploring how structuralism and deconstruction have informed recent theory around 'AI' and 'LLMs' including @leifw.bsky.social's Language Machines: olrsupplement.com/2026/06/01/w...

Finally something smart written about AI from a humanistic perspective that isn’t just a diatribe about plagiarism and five million other things condensed into one master sign. Highly recommend these excellent reflections!!

Jonathan Basile@jonothingeb.bsky.social · 2mo ago

I wrote an essay exploring how structuralism and deconstruction have informed recent theory around 'AI' and 'LLMs' including @leifw.bsky.social's Language Machines: olrsupplement.com/2026/06/01/w...

I'm thrilled to be co-editing this collection, Dialectical Biology Today: Legacies of Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin, an outgrowth of the conference we did last year, bringing historians and philosophers of biology and evolutionary biologists to reflect on these influences in their own work

chris shambaugh@cshambaugh.bsky.social · 3mo ago

I’m happy to share that our book proposal has been accepted in Routledge’s History and Philosophy of Biology series! I’m so excited and honored to be co-editing the volume - titled Dialectical Biology Today: Legacies of Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin - with Jonathan Basile and Denis Walsh.

"Harden asegura que se opone a la eugenesia: no obstante, está ignorando lo que significa ese término para la mayoría de historiadores del tema, quienes ven su más reciente iteración en esta individualización ascendente y neoliberal del cribado y aborto de embriones supuestamente disgénicos."

Bird account@dialecticbio.bsky.social · 3mo ago

I implore everyone to read this brilliant book review of Kathryn Paige Harden new book on the genetics of criminality. It cuts right through the bullshit to state plainly what Harden's project really is: eugenics bullshit and grifting lareviewofbooks.org/article/orig...

If you ever did 23AndMe or the UK Biobank your data was used by this vile eugenicist to claim people are racially predisposed to being sinful, and therefore punishable. In light of the final blow to the Voting Rights Act it's important to know how these arguments look, where they come from.

Natural Election | Los Angeles Review of Books

Kathryn Paige Harden’s new book offers a defense of a kind of Scientific Calvinism that converges with the eugenicist ideals of the contemporary Far Right.

lareviewofbooks.org

"Original Sin features a series of anecdotes about Harden’s [life], and becoming a geneticist only to realize she was still obsessed with the same questions of sin and redemption she had learned in church....The book reads like an Eat Pray Love of biotech grifting." - @jonothingeb.bsky.social

Natural Election | Los Angeles Review of Books

Kathryn Paige Harden’s new book offers a defense of a kind of Scientific Calvinism that converges with the eugenicist ideals of the contemporary Far Right.

lareviewofbooks.org

I implore everyone to read this brilliant book review of Kathryn Paige Harden new book on the genetics of criminality. It cuts right through the bullshit to state plainly what Harden's project really is: eugenics bullshit and grifting lareviewofbooks.org/article/orig...

Natural Election | Los Angeles Review of Books

Kathryn Paige Harden’s new book offers a defense of a kind of Scientific Calvinism that converges with the eugenicist ideals of the contemporary Far Right.

lareviewofbooks.org