OONI

@ooni.org

Exposing internet censorship worldwide since 2012. Open data. Free software. Global community. https://ooni.org/

‼️ Saudi Arabia just blocked Tinder explorer.ooni.org/findings/305... Today, OONI data shows that Tinder started being blocked on Mobily (AS35819) by means of TLS interference. We were alerted of this block through our new Censorship Alert System, an internal prototype we're testing. 🙏🐙 #ooni

OONI data on the blocking of Tinder in Saudi Arabia

From Heuristics to Anonymous Credentials: Assessing OONI's Approach to Bad Measurements ooni.org/post/2026-fa... In our latest blog post, we share: • New heuristics & strategies for mitigating faulty measurements • An evaluation of the effectiveness of our new Anonymous Credential System 🐙✨ #ooni

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⚖️ Kenya's High Court ruled the government cannot arbitrarily block websites, striking down the Cybercrimes Act clause behind past shutdowns. The winning petition drew on OONI's evidence of Telegram blocking during KCSE exams. 🌐 📄 Our report: ooni.org/post/2025-ke...

ooni.org

🔴 New report: Collateral Damage of IP-Based Blocking During LALIGA Football Streaming in Spain: Evidence from OONI Measurements ooni.org/post/2026-la... Our latest report documents widespread collateral damage caused by IP blocks in #Spain during LALIGA football broadcasts over the past 6 months.

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When Local Blocks Go Global: The India-Telegram BGP Incident In this post, I dig into the leaked hijack intended to block Telegram in India — the latest intentional, but also accidental BGP mishap, in which a domestic block escapes, disrupting a service worldwide. www.kentik.com/blog/when-lo...

When Local Blocks Go Global: The India-Telegram BGP Incident

Yesterday’s leak of a BGP hijack intended to block Telegram in India is the latest routing mishap best described as intentional, but also accidental — a pattern dating back to Pakistan Telecom’s infam...

kentik.com

Cloudflare Radar data confirms early indications of a partial Internet restoration in Iran, nearly three months after the shutdown began. Traffic spikes and DNS queries have risen, but network activity is currently just 40% of pre-shutdown levels. blog.cloudflare.com/iran-interne...

Iran's Internet is partially restored, Cloudflare Radar data shows

Cloudflare Radar data confirms early indications of a partial Internet restoration in Iran, nearly three months after the shutdown began. Traffic spikes and DNS queries have risen, but network activit...

blog.cloudflare.com

🚨Update on the partial restoration of internet in Iran. It has been 24hrs+ since service started coming back in Iran. In that time, traffic levels peaked at 41% of what we saw prior to Jan 8th, which is also below the Jan 27-Feb 28 partial restoration. #DigitalBlackOutIran

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