Open Mind

@openmindjournal.bsky.social

Cognitive science journal published by MIT Press. https://direct.mit.edu/opmi

The Role of Reinforcement Learning in Pragmatic Reasoning Tasks: Modeling and Validating the Sources of Individual Differences

AbstractIn Gricean pragmatics, inference during communication is regarded as a form of rational, domain-general reasoning about the intentions of other agents. Studies using the pictorial communication “reference game” task are sometimes used in support of this hypothesis. Yet, measures of pragmatic reasoning in this task sometimes reveal poor performance, with participants requiring many rounds of play before they exhibit patterns which match Gricean inferences, and demonstrating substantial individual differences in behavior. Do these results challenge the idea of widespread inferencing via fundamental social competence? We advance an alternative proposal here, which posits that these patterns emerge as a factor of the way participants perform pragmatic reasoning in a task: namely, they prefer to use simpler interpretation strategies until experience motivates the use of additional resources. Building off of work modeling task adaptation as reinforcement learning, we use the cognitive architecture ACT-R to simulate the expected behavior of individuals with this kind of resource-rational performance algorithm, subject to individualized parameters for reinforcement learning. These simulations provide a proof-of-concept for our adaptation proposal, recreating known patterns and generating new concrete predictions for the particular domain-general sources of individual variance in reference game tasks. We then go on to validate some of these new predictions in a pre-registered experiment, and find that pragmatic response behavior is indeed related to a participant’s general persistence in self-directed exploration of strategies for task completion. Our results offer a path to reconcile variable empirical data with models of core pragmatic competence. From a broader perspective, we see this as an important step towards more robust theories of performance factors in pragmatic reasoning, and ultimately, a case study in the value of process-level computational modeling.

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Core Intuitions of Psychological Non-Contradiction: Infants Assume That Individual Agents Act and Communicate Coherently

AbstractHumans generally posit that contrary mental states are unlikely to co-exist within a single mind. We tested the early ontogeny of this assumption in two domains: action and communication. Studies 1A and 1B tested whether 9-month-old infants assume that agents act coherently. Infants watched interactions between two hands whose owner(s) were invisible. In the contrary goals condition, the hand performed contrary actions—one hand reached for an object while the other impeded it. Later, during test trials, infants learned that the hands belonged to one or two people. Looking-time patterns across the contrary goals and a baseline conditions indicated that clear goal conflict led infants to infer two agents, suggesting they viewed it as unlikely for a single person to thwart their own goal. Study 2 tested whether infants assume communicative coherence, testing whether they assume that a single informant is unlikely to entertain and communicate conflicting information while two informants might do so. Informants pointed to indicate a toy’s location to 15-month-olds. When two different informants each pointed to a different place, infants did not follow one pointing gesture more than the other. However, when a single informant pointed successively to two locations, infants followed the second gesture, implying they viewed it as an updated, not contradictory, message. Thus, infants assumed that a single informant is unlikely to contradict themselves (i.e., by asserting that a toy is simultaneously in two locations). These findings reveal an early-emerging assumption of psychological coherence in infants’ representation of other minds, across both action and communication contexts.

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Response Requirements Shape the Spatial Coding of Location-Specific Adjustments to Conflict Frequency

AbstractHumans adjust to the frequency of conflicting stimuli so that the detrimental behavioral effects of frequent conflicts become smaller than those of rare conflicts. These adjustments become contingent on the locations where frequent and infrequent conflicts have been encountered. Experimentally such phenomena are studied by means of conflict tasks, a prominent one being the Simon task of the present experiments. Our Simon task involved four stimulus locations (upper-left, upper-right, lower-left, lower-right). Conflict frequency was manipulated for two diagonally opposite locations. For example, conflict frequency was low at the upper-left location and high at the lower-right location. At the remaining (non-manipulated) locations conflict frequency was intermediate. In Experiment 1 participants responded to stimulus colors by pressing a left or right key, in Experiment 2 by pressing a lower or upper key. We observed larger conflict effects for the low-conflict location than for the high-conflict location. Crucially, these adjustments to conflict frequency transferred to non-manipulated locations depending on the response configuration: transfer regions were the left or right hemifield with left-right responses, but the lower or upper hemifield with lower-upper responses. Assuming that transfer regions around manipulated stimulus locations are defined by identical (or similar) spatial codes, the pattern of transfer suggests a process of weighted two-dimensional location coding. According to this notion, the spatial dimension that is relevant for response discrimination has stronger weight in the coding of stimulus locations than a response-irrelevant dimension, and can therefore produce anisotropic transfer of conflict-frequency effects around manipulated locations.

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