Rorty QOTD

@rortyquotes.bsky.social

Richard McKay Rorty (October 4, 1931 – June 8, 2007): pragmatist, ironist, and panrelationalist.

Once we give up the idea that the point of discourse is to represent reality accurately, we shall have no interest in distinguishing social constructs from other things. We shall confine ourselves to debating the utility of alternative social constructs. PasAA p.139 #Pragmatism #Rorty #Upayas

In one sense of the term “social construction,” human rights are social constructions, but then so are neutrinos and giraffes. In that sense, to be a social construction is simply to be the intentional object of a certain set of sentences—sentences used in some societies and not in others.’ All that it takes to be an object is to be talked about in a reasonably coherent way, but not everybody needs to talk in all ways—nor, therefore, about all objects. Once we give up the idea that the point of discourse is to represent reality accurately, we shall have no interest in distinguishing social constructs from other things. We shall confine ourselves to debating the utility of alternative social constructs.

Pragmatists do not intend claims which have the form “To say such-and-such is to say so-and-so” as claims about what is really going on—claims that what appeared to be a fact is actually a value, or what appeared to be a cognition is actually an emotion. PasAA p.139 #Pragmatism #Rorty #Upayas

Claims of the sort I have just made—claims which have the form “To say such-and-such is to say so-and-so”—are often interpreted in terms of the reality-appearance distinction. Metaphysically inclined thinkers, obsessed by the distinction between knowledge and opinion or between reason and passion, interpret such claims as “irrationalist” and “emotivist.” But pragmatists do not intend these as claims about what is really going on—claims that what appeared to be a fact is actually a value, or what appeared to be a cognition is actually an emotion. Rather, these claims are practical recommendations about what to talk about, suggestions about the terms in which controversy on moral questions is best conducted.

The pragmatist can cheerfully agree with Nietzsche that the idea of human brotherhood would only have occurred to the weak. But for pragmatists this fact no more counts against the idea than Socrates’s ugliness counts against his account of the nature of love. PasAA p.138 #Pragmatism #Fruitfulness

This metaphysical suggestion is vulnerable to Nietzschean suggestions that both God & human rights are superstitions—contrivances put forward by the weak to protect themselves against the strong. Whereas metaphysicians reply to Nietzsche by asserting that there is a “rational basis” for belief in God or in human rights, pragmatists reply by saying that there is nothing wrong with contrivances. The pragmatist can cheerfully agree with Nietzsche that the idea of human brotherhood would only have occurred to the weak—to the people being shoved around by the brave, strong, happy warriors whom Nietzsche idolizes. But for pragmatists this fact no more counts against the idea of human rights than Socrates’s ugliness counts against his account of the nature of love…Once you drop the distinction between reason and passion, you will no longer discriminate against a good idea because of its dubious origins. You will classify ideas according to their relative utility rather than by their sources.