Truth Without Liars: The Verification Collapse Cascade—A Response to the Post-Truth Consensus, Kenji Yamada

The post-truth literature has given us our dominant vocabulary for the erosion of truth in public life, and it has done so around a single organizing figure: the intentional agent who distorts. Lee McIntyre (2018) defined “post-truth” as a condition in which emotions and beliefs exert greater influence on policy than objective facts, tracing its lineage through science denialism to postmodern relativism; his later…

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SERRC: Volume 15, Issue 7, 1–97, July 2026

Volume 15, Issue 7, 1–97, July 2026 ❧ Lawler, Diego and Jesús Vega-Encabo. 2026. “Between Generics and Forms of Life: Toward a Practical Ontology of Artifacts.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (7): 1–20. ❧ Cormick, Claudio and Valeria Edelsztein. 2026. “More Diversity, Better Science? On Evidence, Specificity, and the Wedge Between Ethical and Epistemic Justifications.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective…

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A Review of Nyholm’s The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Introduction, Moti Mizrahi

Sven Nyholm’s The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Introduction (Hackett Publishing 2026) is a clear, well-written, accessible, and fairly comprehensive philosophical introduction to the ethics of artificial intelligence. In each chapter, Nyholm raises pressing ethical questions about the development and deployment of technologies that can be broadly characterized as “artificial intelligence.” Nyholm does a great job of motivating different answers to these questions, thereby offering the reader various ways of approaching them.

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Thoughts on Cyberpositionality: The Construction of Digital Communities in Digital Spaces, Damien Patrick Williams

I found Rebecca Monteleone, Martin Perez Comisso, and Elma Hajric’s “Cyberpositionality: Sociotechnical Location in the Digital Age” (2024) to be an extremely timely and important article which can greatly influence how academics and the general public think not only about online spaces, communities, and selves, but also about algorithmic systems and tools, across the board. Their central argument—that there is something both real and importantly different about the way that our identities are positioned in online digital spaces—is one which has precursors in other areas of investigation, but it is laid out here in ways carefully relating it to how humans are categorized, read, rendered, and reproduced by algorithmic systems.

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Radical Dependence Is Not Enough: Comments on Grygieńć’s “Political Debate under Epistemic Asymmetries”, Jason Brennan

In his recent paper “Political Debate under Epistemic Asymmetries,”[1] Janusz Grygieńć argues that political theorists have underestimated the importance of epistemic asymmetries (EAs). Epistemic asymmetries occur whenever some people have first-hand or at least well-grounded knowledge while others must rely on their testimony. Many political issues, such as climate change, vaccines, trade policy, and national defense are dominated by these asymmetries.

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Toward a Probabilistic Epistemology of Interpretation, Sibansu Mukherjee

The rapid expansion of generative artificial intelligence has initiated a transformation that is not merely technological but epistemological and ontological. Contemporary AI systems increasingly mediate the conditions under which interpretation, semantic authority, and epistemic legitimacy emerge. This article argues that artificial intelligence transforms the ontology of meaning by shifting interpretation from phenomenological disclosure toward probabilistic stabilization—a transition better described as an infrastructural eclipse than as a definitive end.

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Revolutions in Mathematics: A Surd Fantasy?—In Part!, Sheldon Richmond

Abstract Do revolutions occur in mathematics? I agree with Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos and Joseph Agassi regarding their view—with a proviso— that in the history of ancient mathematics, early modern mathematics, as well as recent mathematics, revolutions occur. The proviso I argue is that mathematics is a continuum in terms of how proofs work. I propose that the main methodology of proof in mathematics has endured since the time of Euclid: Euclid provides a methodology for proof that has endured until today through to Stephen Cook … .

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Making Epistemic Considerations Primary Does Not Make Social Values Secondary: A Reply to Hilligardt, Cathrine Holst

I have learnt a lot from some of Hannah Hilligardt’s previous contributions, most recently her article “Science as Public Service” (Hilligardt 2024; see also Langvatn and Holst 2026), and I am grateful for her generous words and engaged discussion of my article “Democratizing Expertise: The Epistemic Approach” (Holst 2025). … . Article Citation: Holst, Cathrine. 2026. “Making Epistemic Considerations Primary Does Not Make Social Values Secondary: A Reply to Hilligardt.” …

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A Response to West’s “Genre Discipline”, Joseph I. Breidenstein Jr

I appreciate Mark D. West clarifying what he means by genre discipline, and I’m on board as far as it goes. Dr. West claims that his original review was meant to protect the methodological challenge of my book Nietzschean, Feminist, and Embodied Perspective on the Presocratics: Philosophy as Partnership (henceforth NFEP)[1],[2] by differentiating the constructive appropriation side of the text from the historical reconstruction side but, as much as I would like to agree with him, I’m not as sure of this as I am that I stand by my first response.

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More Diversity, Better Science? On Evidence, Specificity, and the Wedge Between Ethical and Epistemic Justifications, Claudio Cormick and Valeria Edelsztein

We are grateful to Leonardo González Galli and Agustín Adúriz-Bravo for an engagement that is both generous and intellectually serious. Much of what follows takes place against a backdrop of substantial agreement. All four of us share a commitment to diversity in research communities, to the value of critical reflection within progressive epistemologies, and to the importance of resisting both obscurantism and anti-scientific attitudes.

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Between Generics and Forms of Life: Toward a Practical Ontology of Artifacts, Part II, Diego Lawler and Jésus Vega-Encabo

5. The Principle of Unity: No Essence, but No Emptiness Either Tim Juvshik’s objection to the notion of a principle of unity identifies a real tension in our original formulation. On the one hand, we speak of a principle that concerns the persistence and identity of artifacts; on the other hand, we deny that this principle can be strictly defined, or that it consists in a fixed form or essence of the artifact.

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Between Generics and Forms of Life: Toward a Practical Ontology of Artifacts, Part I, Diego Lawler and Jésus Vega-Encabo

We are grateful to Tim Juvshik for his careful engagement (2026) with our article (2025). His commentary is valuable because it identifies a significant issue in our proposal: whether an ontology of artifacts centered on maintenance and repair needs the notions of natural history, life-form/form of life, and principle of unity, or whether the same phenomena can be explained more economically by appeal to kinds, generics, and social practices.

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SERRC: Volume 15, Issue 6, 1–66, June 2026

Volume 15, Issue 6, 1–66, June 2026 ❧ Hauswald, Rico. 2026. “On ‘Bullshit Machines’ and Artificial Epistemic Authorities: A Response to Mizrahi.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (6): 1–4. ❧ Atkins, Richard Kenneth. 2026. “Epistemic Requirements and Ethical Responsibilities: Remarks in Response to Kasser’s Gentle Nudges.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (6): 5–12. ❧ Salwa, Mateusz. 2026.

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What “Taming Human Subjects” Solved—and What Remained: A Response to Morawski, Carol Ting

Abstract About five years ago, “Taming Human Subjects” emerged from a practical question that arose while learning to conduct experiments: if human subjects are so difficult to study, how do experimental findings nevertheless come to appear orderly and reproducible? At the time, answering that question felt like closure. Jill Morawski’s commentary encouraged me to look again at what the paper left unexplored.

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Reflecting on Jack David Eller’s Apisteology, Lee Basham

What follows is hybrid of a book review and rejoinders to Jack David Eller’s Apisteology: The Study of Not Believing and of its sometimes surprising claims. A caution: Do not address Jack as Jack in correspondence, stated book authorship notwithstanding. We are cautioned by Jack that only his friends are permitted to call him “Jack”. In what follows we will simply use Eller for Jack.

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Pyrrhonian Skepticism about Philosophy, Part III, László Bernáth and János Tőzsér

5. Doing Philosophy in the Spirit of Pyrrhonian Skepticism about Philosophy Suppose we have shown that Pyrrhonian Skepticism about Philosophy (PSP) does not undermine itself, since it is committed only to the truth of substantive propositions that anyone is inalienably entitled to believe. If so, then you must take the Argument from Disagreement (AfD) seriously—you can no longer dismiss it with the familiar response that, since PSP is self-defeating, its skeptical challenge may simply be ignored.

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Pyrrhonian Skepticism about Philosophy, Part II, László Bernáth and János Tőzsér

3. Answers to the Pyrrhonian Skeptical Challenge The AfD presented above [Part I] is a formally valid chain of inferences starting from the phenomenon of permanent philosophical disagreement. Accordingly, if you reject the conclusion of the AfD, you must deny one of its premises—more precisely, one of the three conditionals it contains. In what follows, we present these objections and show what reasons you can have for maintaining substantive philosophical beliefs despite permanent disagreement.

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Pyrrhonian Skepticism about Philosophy, Part I, László Bernáth and János Tőzsér

By Pyrrhonian Skepticism about Philosophy (PSP) we mean the view that, considering the permanent and pervasive dissensus in philosophy, you cannot maintain your philosophical beliefs—you should suspend them, or at least significantly (and perhaps painfully) reduce your confidence in their truth. … . Article Citation: Bernáth, László and János Tőzsér. 2026. “Pyrrhonian Skepticism about Philosophy.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective…

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A Review of Gabriele Contessa’s Science Denial, Tommaso Piazza

Gabriele Contessa’s Science Denial (2025) offers an exceptional illustration of how philosophy, when done at its best, can illuminate and help us make sense of issues that fall outside its traditional domains of inquiry. … . Article Citation: Piazza, Tommaso. 2026. “A Review of Gabriele Contessa’s Science Denial.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (6): 22–27. 📄 The…

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The Aesthetics of Biomimicry, Mateusz Salwa

Recent scholarship aims to broaden the scope of philosophical aesthetics. As a result, identifying aesthetics solely with the philosophy of fine arts has become problematic. While traditional questions concerning aesthetic values such as beauty, aesthetic experience (appreciation), and notions about art, creativity and imitation remain relevant and largely define contemporary discussions within aesthetics, these questions also get applied to fields far beyond the traditional aesthetic boundaries—e.g., business, environments, food, the everyday, design, law, politics, and sport.

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Epistemic Requirements and Ethical Responsibilities: Remarks in Response to Kasser’s Gentle Nudges, Richard Kenneth Atkins

Ever a charitable reader and rigorous thinker, Jeff Kasser has generously written a critical reply to my essay “Apology for an Average Believer” (2024). I am grateful for the time and effort he expended in doing so. I have learned much from conversation with him and from his published works on the epistemology of belief. For my own work to be the object of his attention is an honor.

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On “Bullshit Machines” and Artificial Epistemic Authorities: A Response to Mizrahi, Rico Hauswald

I would like to thank Moti Mizrahi for his response to Hauswald (2026), where I discuss the two arguments he advances against my account of artificial epistemic authorities (see Hauswald 2025; Mizrahi 2025). I would also like to thank James Collier for inviting me to continue our dialogue. … . Article Citation: Hauswald. Rico. 2026. “On ‘Bullshit Machines’ and Artificial Epistemic Authorities: A Response to Mizrahi.” …

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SERRC Volume 15, Issue 8, 1–68, May 2026

Volume 15, Issue 5, 1–68, May 2026 ❧ Breidenstein Jr, Joseph I. 2026. “A Response to West’s ‘Usable Antiquity’.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (5): 1–8. ❧ Galli, Leonardo González. 2026. “A Commentary on Edelsztein and Cormick’s ‘If It’s Too Good to be True, It Ain’t’.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (5): 9–14. ❧ Riggio, Adam.

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Mediation, Morphology, and Technical Knowledge: A Reply to Mickevičius on Simondon, Marco Tamborini

Tomas Nemunas Mickevičius’s fascinating “Gilbert Simondon as a Philosopher of (Technological) Mediation” (2024) builds on Pascal Chabot’s observation that Simondon is “the philosopher of technical mediation. For him, it is central” (338). Mickevičius then systematises the dimensions of mediation into four levels: ontogenetic, conceptual-paradigmatic, concrete-political, and phenomenotechnological. The claim that mediation is a “necessary addition” to the canonical list of Simondonian concepts is defensible and productive, and the reconstruction of its levels is philologically precise.

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From Epistemic Authority to the Social Ecology of Knowledge: A Reply to Vučković, Dominik Jarczewski

Abstract This reply to Aleksandra Vučković clarifies two aspects of my earlier critique of Pre-emptionism and develops a positive alternative account of epistemic authority. It argues that evidentialist approaches may adequately capture epistemic permissions but fail to explain the positive obligations we may bear toward epistemically superior agents. Drawing on systems theory, it proposes understanding epistemic authority within a broader epistemic ecology structured by multiple social epistemic goods, including reputation, trust, and epistemic character.

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Circularity, Unknowability, and Skepticism, Benjamin W. McCraw

Again, I want to begin by thanking Peter Baumann for the continued dialogue and thought devoted to my work. In this quick reply (rejoinder?), I want to select a few of the most salient points in Baumann’s most recent exchange and reflect a bit on them. … . Article Citation: McCraw, Benjamin W. 2026. “Circularity, Unknowability, and Skepticism.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective…

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Between Scylla and Charybdis … There Is Always the Strait of Messina: A Response to Edelsztein and Cormick, Agustín Adúriz-Bravo

Scylla fascistiscientia and Charybdis blandipensamentum could very well be the names of the species of legendary epistemological monsters that Valeria Edelsztein and Claudio Cormick are trying to fight in their indeed very appealing article (2026). The precise individuals of those species chased throughout the text seem to be the grandiloquent, politically uncomfortable and vacuous secrets de Polichinelle of theoreticism, on the one hand, and a corpus of “untenable” pseudo-laws by self-perceived progressive epistemologies working with low standards of intellectual rigour, on the other.

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On Genre Discipline: A Reply to Breidenstein, Mark D. West

Abstract This reply clarifies the genre distinction at issue in my review of Joseph Breidenstein’s Nietzschean, Feminist, and Embodied Perspectives on the Presocratics: the distinction between historically constrained reconstruction and constructive philosophical appropriation. I argue that Breidenstein’s response, especially its disclosure of the metaphysical project standing behind the earlier book, confirms rather than dissolves the need to mark evidentiary registers, and I use Eleusis as a test case for why institutional, comparative, and constructive claims should not be allowed to reinforce one another by association.

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Can One Grieve a Way of Knowing? Introducing Epistemological Grief, Maud Woiczik

Can one grieve a way of knowing the world? This article proceeds from the hypothesis that the answer is yes—and that this potential experience remains difficult to name with existing conceptual tools. This difficulty becomes particularly discernible when considering the situation of certain Indigenous students whose intellectual formation has been built outside of dominant epistemic frameworks. In postsecondary institutions, something may be lost—something that goes beyond the question of intellectual recognition.

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Experiments in New Directions for Humanity and Philosophy—Technologies of the Future Self: An Ethics for Transhuman Flourishing, Adam Riggio

Prologue This piece is my own reaction to the ideas and arguments in a fascinating volume of transhumanist scholarship and research, Technologies of the Future Self. My point of view is that of a friendly skeptic, and so plenty of contributors will likely have some interesting responses to my critiques. Since so many of its contributors are members and affiliates of the SERRC community, it would be wonderful if this essay could start a conversation about transhumanism, its religious heritages, what a fully secular transhumanism could be, and the future of this philosophy.

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