Still counting votes, but the breadth of the shift towards Paxton, and how modestly the shift varies geographically, is striking
According to the May @apsa.bsky.social's eJobs bulletin, tenure-track job postings are still 27% below where they were at this point in the 2023–24 cycle.
The vivid partisan sorting of US house districts by income and party -- 2005 -2024
Given declining US confidence in institutions overall, striking that low election confidence is *not* a secular trend--instead 2020 is the disjuncture. Plot shows the winner/loser effect demonstrated by Charles Stewart and others. Data from @mitelectionlab.bsky.social
In the April @apsa.bsky.social ejobs release, we're still tracking a 30% decline in political science tenure track jobs since 2023-24.
Striking partisan stability in Israel/Gaza attitudes in the 2025 CES study
Political Science's academic job market having its worst post-Covid year -- almost 20% fewer jobs than at the same point in the previous cycle (which itself was bad!) Data scraped from APSA ejobs pdfs.
Bookmakers have shifted Democratic chances of winning the White House in 2028 by 2pp since the start of the Iran war
Pedagogical opportunity to remind undergraduates that the Democratic party used to dominate the presidential vote in the Mahoning Valley.
APSA authored papers by subfield and department, 2018-2025. A coarse but interesting look at the areas of research activity in the discipline.
To show prospective students our discipline's research priorities, I scraped the last 6 @apsa-preprints.bsky.social annual meeting programs to count papers by section, then assigned sections to subfields. Polisci remains fascinated with the American case!
Things undergrads are surprised to learn -- there are only modest amounts spent on American politics. data from @opensecrets.org and US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Trump's first year in office saw a rapid decline in GOP affiliation, erasing the advantage in net partisanship that had endured during the Biden term. data from @gallup.com
Views of American industrial sectors remain strikingly non-ideological (save for the publishing, the movie industry, and fossil fuels).
The consequences of low media trust and Republican partisanship--only 1 news media source enjoys over 30% use among those partisans. Data from @pewresearch.org's American Trends Panel, March 2025.
Among the most vivid declines in the American people's trust -- their diminished trust in other people. Data from @gallup.com's Social Series.
The shrinking levels of white ethnocentrism in the @electionstudies.bsky.social Cumulative Datafile conceal a pretty striking partisan effect: since around 2012 very low ethnocentrism among white Democrats, but the opposite effect among other Democrats.
With thanks to amengel.bsky.social, the decline is far more modest when I take proper account for the administrative codes in the feeling thermometers
Americans have become increasingly confident that their votes are counted as intended—aside from a sharp drop among Republicans in 2020. Data from the Survey of the Performance of American Elections.
When 'When Prophecy Fails' Fails: onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1... (h/t @ethanvporter.bsky.social )
Debunking “When Prophecy Fails”
In 1954, Dorothy Martin predicted an apocalyptic flood and promised her followers rescue by flying saucers. When neither arrived, she recanted, her group dissolved, and efforts to proselytize ceased....
onlinelibrary.wiley.com
In 2025, polarization on schools & the Supreme Court leaves only Banks + Big Business with moderate/high confidence across parties. Populism still cuts across partisan lines. Data: @gallup.com Social Series.
The recent reversal in Republicans' moral approval of Gay and Lesbian relations is even more striking in context -- it does *not* coincide with more restrictive moral licensing in other areas. Data from Gallup's Social Series.
The inversion between income and Whites' presidential vote is also found among the validated voters in the just released Cooperative Election Study.
Something undergrads after often surprised to find out--there's curiously little money in American politics.
The last time I posted the income relationship to presidential vote among White respondents to the @electionstudies.bsky.social ANES, people asked for additional estimates among all voters. Updated estimates here:
Rapid secularization of Democratic politics continues -- in the 2024 ANES, only 54% of Democrats reported religion an important part of their life.
Trump's presidency has coincided with a rapid decline in GOP partisan advantage -- a 5 percentage point decline since the end of Biden's presidency. Data from Gallup social series.
Might be of interest to those teaching American politics -- motivated reasoning in retrospective economic/personal/geostrategic evaluation has been a stable part of presidential elections for 40 years. Data from the @electionstudies.bsky.social CDF and 2024 timeseries.
By the end of 2024, Stimson's Policy Mood was near 20 year highs in liberal policy support. (Ht @mattgrossmann.bsky.social for tweeting the new data!)
As expected, the change in government sharply reduced Democrats’ trust in the CDC and FDA. But surprisingly, by 2025 Democrats now express higher trust in federal health authorities than Republicans do.
