[1/6] 🧵Hi there! Our paper "Deep Incentive Design with Differentiable Equilibrium Blocks" is out now, born from my internship at Google DeepMind with @lukemarris.bsky.social and Georgios Piliouras. Thread below! Paper: arxiv.org/abs/2603.07705

If ICLR is any indication, LLMs + Game Theory / Multi-Agent is thriving. We'd love to see your research ideas at AAMAS this May in Cyprus! Submission deadline is Feb 4. More details below.

@drimgemp.bsky.social · 9mo ago

Have you been using LLMs to play games, to negotiate your salary, or strategize in other cool ways? Whether it succeeded or failed spectacularly, we are interested in seeing your demos at our “Strategic Engineering” workshop at #AAMAS2026 in Cyprus! Starter library @ github.com/google-deepm...!

Unlike board games, real-world strategic interactions are messy. Traditional game theory thus needs a boost for the age of agentic AI. Our #AAMAS2026 workshop "Strategic Engineering"(sites.google.com/view/se-aama...) in Cyprus aims to bridge the gap. Come join us to unlock truly strategic AI!

[1/2]Our work “Learning to steer Markovian Agents under Model Uncertainty” explores the problem of steering (unknown) learning dynamics in Markov Games towards desirable outcomes (e.g. Pareto optimal Nash). My co-author Jiawei Huang is presenting it at ICLR on Apr 24, 3:00-5:30pm GMT+8, Poster #401.

E65: NeurIPS 2024 – Posters and Hallways 3 - Claire Bizon Monroc of Inria : WFCRL for Wind Farm Control Andrew Wagenmaker of @ucberkeleyofficial.bsky.social : Leveraging Simulation to Bridge Sim-to-Real Gap - @harwiltz.bsky.social of @mila-quebec.bsky.social : Multivariate Distributional RL (cont)

I'm at AAAI this week, presenting our paper “Computing Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Sequential Auctions” (arxiv.org/abs/2312.04516) done at @eth-ai-center.bsky.social. If interested, join the poster session (#657 on Saturday 12:30 – 14:30) or oral presentation (room 115C on Sunday 2pm).

Computing Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Sequential Auctions with Verification

We present an algorithm for computing pure-strategy epsilon-perfect Bayesian equilibria in sequential auctions with continuous action and value spaces. Importantly, our algorithm includes a verificati...

arxiv.org