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West European Politics

@wepsocial.bsky.social

Editors: Klaus H. Goetz, Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, Wolfgang C. Müller. Posts by social media editor @chdausgaard.bsky.social WEP on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/west-european-politics/

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West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · yesterday

🇪🇺 Do heatwaves at home make MEPs talk climate? @buzogany.bsky.social, @mihailchiru.bsky.social & @vladsurdea.bsky.social match 2 decades of district weather to 130,000+ EP questions. More hazards go with more climate questions, but the link mostly runs between countries. 🔗 doi.org/10.1080/0140...

Description of the article "Climate-related hazards and issue attention to climate policy in the European Parliament" by Aron Buzogány, Mihail Chiru and Vlad Surdea-Hernea, published online first in West European Politics.

Three-panel plot from the interaction models, showing predicted climate attention across hazard levels for three party positions: environmentally friendly (solid green), neutral or centrist (dashed grey) and environmental sceptic (dotted orange). The green line sits above the other two in every panel and the three run broadly parallel — party position sets the level of climate attention rather than conditioning how MEPs respond to hazards. Predicted attention rises with wet-spell exposure but declines across the observed range of heat episodes and temperature anomalies in these models.

Three-panel line plot showing the predicted share of an MEP's written questions that concern climate change as district heat episodes, wet spells and temperature anomalies increase. All three panels slope upward, with shaded confidence bands widening at higher hazard levels. These are the baseline models without country fixed effects; the paper reports that the associations disappear once country fixed effects are added.

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · yesterday

🌡️ What makes people support climate policy? In two experiments, @mguinjoan.bsky.social, @tonirodon.bsky.social and @joelardiaca.bsky.social find cost framing sharply cuts support. Further, redistribution plays a key role: citizens favour policies helping the poorest. 🔗 doi.org/10.1080/0140...

Description of the article "Public support for climate policies: costs, redistribution, and ideological divides" by Marc Guinjoan, Toni Rodon and Joel Ardiaca, published online first in West European Politics.

Dot plot showing the change in mean support for ten climate policies when their costs (red) or benefits (green) are made explicit, relative to a control group given no such information. Cost framing pushes support down for most policies — furthest for reducing intensive irrigation (−0.9 points on the 0–10 scale), closing thermal power plants and a carbon tax (both −0.7) — while benefit framing produces only small changes clustered around zero.

Coefficient plot of marginal means from the conjoint experiment: the probability of choosing a city with each attribute. The four climate policies each raise the probability modestly, higher costs lower it more than higher benefits raise it, and the situation of the poorest matters most — the probability rises to 0.60 when the poorest are expected to improve and falls to 0.37 when they are expected to worsen, while the situation of the wealthiest barely shifts choices.

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · yesterday

📖 New issue out! West European Politics 49(6) 🎉 👉 EU long-termism, enlargement and defence, the Green Deal, climate policy's rural geography, defending democracy, electoral legitimacy, judicial diversity, plus the Irish 2024 and Czech 2025 elections. 🔗 www.tandfonline.com/toc/fwep20/4...

West European Politics

Volume 49, Issue 6 of West European Politics

tandfonline.com

Joel Ardiaca @joelardiaca.bsky.social · last wk.

🎉 Very happy to see my first published paper finally out in @wepsocial.bsky.social ! In this paper, we study public support for climate policies. Across two experiments in Spain, we find that perceived costs matter more than benefits, while redistribution plays a key role in shaping public support.

Toni Rodon @tonirodon.bsky.social · last wk.

🚨 New article🔥 with @mguinjoan.bsky.social & @joelardiaca.bsky.social in @wepsocial.bsky.social ➡️Climate action often enjoys broad public support... until governments propose specific measures. The key? Costs, benefits, and who pays 🧵 www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....

Public support for climate policies: costs, redistribution, and ideological divides

Securing public support for climate policies remains a major challenge. Citizens’ perceptions of the costs, benefits, and distributive consequences of these policies are key factors shaping their a...

tandfonline.com

Marc Guinjoan @mguinjoan.bsky.social · last wk.

🚨 Publication alert! Why is it so hard to win public support for concrete climate policies, even when there's broad consensus that action is needed? New paper with @tonirodon.bsky.social and @joelardiaca.bsky.social in @wepsocial.bsky.social 🧵� @politiquesuab.bsky.social @politiquesupf.bsky.social

Public support for climate policies: costs, redistribution, and ideological divides

tandfonline.com

Nuffield College Library @nuffieldlibrary.bsky.social · 4w ago

Perceived class positions and opinion-based polarisation: experimental evidence from the UK doi.org/10.1080/0140... Paper in @wepsocial.bsky.social by @ronjasczepanski.bsky.social and @nuffieldcollege.bsky.social Fellow Geoffrey Evans

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West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · 4w ago

🌍 How do MPs talk about climate change? Analysing Italian MP's speeches, @paridecarrara.bsky.social, @paologambacciani.bsky.social & Luca Pinto find that the right stresses immediate local harm, the left long-term fixes. Where deadly storms hit, the gap widens. 🔗 doi.org/10.1080/0140...

Title and abstract page of the article “How party ideology and constituency risk shape MPs’ speeches on climate change” by Paride Carrara, Paolo Gambacciani and Luca Pinto, published online first in West European Politics. The abstract’s three findings sentences are highlighted.

Dot-and-whisker plot (Figure 2) showing each Italian parliamentary party group’s average Impacts-Responses Attention Balance in climate speeches (18th legislature, 2018–2022), with 95% confidence intervals; negative values indicate more attention to Specific Impacts, positive values more attention to Systemic Responses.

Two-panel plot (Figure 3) of conditional marginal effects with 95% confidence bands: the left panel shows the marginal effect of a party’s left-right position rising as a constituency’s victim rate from natural events increases; the right panel shows the marginal effect of the victim rate rising across the party left-right scale.

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · 4w ago

👥 Do we back our class — or where we think it stands? In a UK experiment, @ronjasczepanski.bsky.social & Geoffrey Evans find working-class Britons feel closer to an immigration or environment camp — pro or anti — once told their class is the majority there. 🔗 doi.org/10.1080/0140...

Title and abstract page of the article “Perceived class positions and opinion-based polarisation: experimental evidence from the UK” by Ronja Sczepanski and Geoffrey Evans, published online first in West European Politics. The abstract’s two findings sentences are highlighted.

Four-panel plot (Figure 5) of predicted values from linear regression models, with 95% confidence intervals, showing how telling working-class respondents that the working class leans pro- or anti-immigration or pro- or anti-environment shifts their closeness to the corresponding opinion-based groups relative to a control condition.

Four-panel plot (Figure 6) of predicted values from linear regression models, with 95% confidence intervals, showing how the same treatments shift the closeness that pro- and anti-immigration and pro- and anti-environment supporters feel toward the working class.

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · last mo.

🗣️ How do MPs talk about political trust? @eefjesteenvoorden.bsky.social, Atle Haugsgjerd, Erika van Elsas, and Tom van der Meer hand-code 20 years of parliamentary debates in four countries. Where trust talk is most common, MPs mostly use it to discredit rivals. 🔗 doi.org/10.1080/0140...

Abstract and title page of "Politicians on political trust: substantive and strategic use in four West European parliaments (1998–2018)" by Eefje Steenvoorden, Atle Haugsgjerd, Erika van Elsas, and Tom van der Meer, published online first in West European Politics.

Table 2: Four types of diagnoses in the coding scheme, distinguishing political (dis)trust and related attitudes for citizens versus politicians as trust subjects, crossed with political trust, related concepts, or non-political trust as the focus.

Figure 5: Pie charts showing purposive frames by coalition/opposition status and by mainstream/challenger party type, across the four countries. Coalition parties lean toward positive framing while opposition parties lean toward blaming and criticising; the mainstream-challenger split shows a similar but weaker pattern, most visible in Portugal, where mainstream parties also frequently use the discrediting frame.

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · last mo.

🏥 How does left-right politics shape health care? Carsten Jensen compares the UK, Denmark, and Germany: partisanship bites hardest on who delivers care, not on financing or regulation — those are locked in by near-universal public demand for quality. 🔗 doi.org/10.1080/0140...

Abstract and title page of "The politics of health care: lessons for welfare state research" by Carsten Jensen, published online first in West European Politics.

Table 1: Overview of cases comparing England, Denmark, and Germany by welfare regime type (residual, encompassing, Bismarckian), decommodification scores, and dominant modes of health care regulation, financing, and delivery, alongside health spending as a share of GDP in 2000 and 2024.

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · last mo.

📈 Good news for West European Politics: our latest Clarivate Journal Impact Factor is up! The two-year impact factor rises from 3.6 to 4.0, and the five-year figure also climbs, to around 5.0. Thank you to our authors, reviewers, and editors. 🔗 www.tandfonline.com/journals/fwe...

West European Politics

West European Politics publishes research on politics, government and public policy in Western Europe, including coverage of the EU and national elections.

tandfonline.com

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · last mo.

🇮🇪 Why was Ireland the exception in a year of anti-incumbent, far-right votes? @conorlittle.bsky.social shows the main parties held firm: Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael renewed their vows, Sinn Féin's vote slid to 19%, and far-right parties won 1.6% and no seats. 🔗 doi.org/10.1080/0140...

First page of the article "The general election of November 2024 in the Republic of Ireland: Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael renew their vows" by Conor Little (University of Limerick), published open access and online first in West European Politics, showing the title, author, and abstract.

Table 1 from the article, comparing the 2024 and 2020 Irish general election results by party. In 2024, Fianna Fáil won 48 seats on 21.9% of the vote, Sinn Féin 39 seats on 19.0% (down from 24.5% in 2020), and Fine Gael 38 seats on 20.8%. Turnout was 59.7%, down from 62.2%.

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · last mo.

🌍 When foreign aid is misused, does the backlash spread? Bernhard Reinsberg & @haleyswedlund.bsky.social ran experiments with 2,205 UK citizens + 117 MPs. A real scandal cut support — and for the public it spread to other recipients too. Suspending the aid didn't undo it. 🔗 doi.org/10.1080/0140...

First page of the article "Fact or fear? Elite and public opinion on the misuse of foreign aid" by Bernhard Reinsberg and Haley Swedlund, published online first in West European Politics, showing the title, authors, and abstract.

Figure 2, a coefficient plot titled "Average treatment effect of aid scandals among citizens." Learning of the scandal lowers UK citizens' support both for direct aid to Tanzania and, by a smaller amount, for direct aid to low-income countries generally — both estimates are negative, with confidence intervals falling left of zero.

Figure 5, a coefficient plot titled "Average treatment effect of aid scandal with donor response among citizens." Even when citizens are also told the UK suspended aid in response, support for direct aid to Tanzania and for aid to low-income countries stays lower — both estimates remain negative — so the donor's response does not offset the backlash.

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · 2mo ago

📍 Heading to EPSS in Belfast this week? WEP editor Klaus Goetz will be there and would be glad to meet colleagues who want to talk through an idea for a symposium or special issue. Just drop him a line at goetz.lmu@gmail.com.

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · 2mo ago

🌍 Do globalisation's losers fear different threats? @heikogiebler.bsky.social, Lukas Antoine and Rasmus Ollroge find that across 30 countries, self-identified losers fear immigration, surveillance and elite influence more — and climate change and discrimination less. 🔗 doi.org/10.1080/0140...

First page of the article "Threat perceptions and the globalisation divide" by Heiko Giebler, Lukas Antoine and Rasmus Ollroge, published online first in West European Politics, showing the title, authors and abstract.

Figure 1: a coefficient plot of average marginal effects estimating how seeing oneself as a loser of globalisation relates to naming each of fifteen societal threats. Immigration, surveillance, large companies' influence and lack of political influence show positive effects, while climate change, discrimination and pandemics show negative effects. Based on 52,218 respondents across 30 countries.

Figure 2: a scatterplot comparing the estimated probability that globalisation losers (vertical axis) and non-losers (horizontal axis) select each societal threat, against a diagonal reference line. Threats above the line, such as immigration and surveillance, are chosen more often by self-identified losers; those below it, such as climate change, more often by non-losers.

Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics @sciencespo-cee.bsky.social · 2mo ago

#VendrediLecture 📚 Do climate proposals pay off at the ballot box? While climate denial is strongly penalised, supporting climate goals is electorally rewarding, contrary to backing ambitious, concrete climate policies, @malojan.bsky.social shows in @wepsocial.bsky.social. doi.org/10.1080/0140...

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · 2mo ago

🇪🇺 Is the EU's openness to trade now its biggest weakness? Sophie Meunier and Alasdair R. Young argue the EU still sets global rules but has limited power for coercive economic statecraft, unlike the US or China. 🔗 doi.org/10.1080/0140...

First page of the article "The EU as a global actor in the geoeconomic age: power and weakness in and through trade" by Sophie Meunier and Alasdair R. Young, published online first in West European Politics, showing the title, authors and abstract.

Figure 1: a two-by-two typology of EU trade policy. The rows distinguish a (geo)political from an economic focus, and the columns a mitigating from a leveraging ambition, producing four categories: weakness through trade, power through trade, weakness in trade and power in trade.

Figure 2: a triangular diagram of an "impossible trinity" with economic interdependence, economic security and geopolitical competition at the three corners. Each side is labelled with an era — the age of globalisation, the geoeconomic age and the Cold War — indicating which two goals are prioritised in each period.

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · 2mo ago

💶 Why did farm-budget fights split EU coalitions but cohesion funds didn't? David Moloney and Mads Dagnis Jensen draw on interviews and EU documents: in the 2021–27 budget, CAP funding split coalitions as states broke ranks, while cohesion coalitions held firm. 🔗 doi.org/10.1080/0140...

First page of the article "Budget games real actors play: examining the agreement on CAP and cohesion for MFF 2021–2027" by David Moloney and Mads Dagnis Jensen, published online first in West European Politics, showing the title, authors and abstract.

Figure 3: a combined bubble chart overlaying the CAP coalitions and the Cohesion Policy coalitions on the same capabilities-versus-cohesion axes, showing how coalition structure differs between the two budget areas.

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · 2mo ago

📈 Does economic inequality feed on itself? Marius Busemeyer takes stock of 25 years of political economy research and argues inequality has become self-reinforcing: rising gaps depress turnout and blunt redistribution, which lets them widen further. 🔗 doi.org/10.1080/0140...

First page of the article “The comparative political economy of inequality: the maturation of an emerging field” by Marius R. Busemeyer, published online first in West European Politics. The page shows the title, the author’s affiliation at the University of Konstanz, and the abstract.

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · 2mo ago

🌍 Do voters reward parties for ambitious climate policies? In a French conjoint experiment, @malojan.bsky.social finds voters reward climate goals and punish denial across party lines — but ambitious, concrete policies bring no average electoral gain and can backfire. 🔗 doi.org/10.1080/0140...

First page of the article “Between goals and means: the electoral consequences of parties’ climate proposals” by Malo Jan, published online first in West European Politics. The page shows the title, the author’s affiliation at Sciences Po, Paris, and the abstract.

Figure 2, “Level of opposition among French citizens to different climate policies” (source: Baromètre Écologie Environnement 2023). A dot plot of the share of citizens opposed to each of eleven policies, with a dashed line at 50%. Opposition is highest for increasing taxes on fossil energy and banning new petrol or diesel cars, and lowest for more public-transport subsidies, regulating new construction, and stricter farming norms.

Figure 3, “Marginal means for attributes in the conjoint experiment”, with a reference line at 0.5. Climate denial is the strongest effect: candidate profiles that stop fighting against climate change have a marginal mean near 0.33, well below 0.5, while making climate action a priority or continuing it sits near 0.58. Effects for democracy, immigration and tax attributes are smaller and closer to 0.5.

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · 2mo ago

⏰ Two weeks to go — Call for Papers West European Politics Symposium: The New Politics of Security and Defence in Europe 300-word abstracts by 20 June → wepsubmissions@gmail.com think.taylorandfrancis.com/special_issu...

Symposium: The New Politics of Security and Defence in Europe: National and EU Perspectives

Symposium: The new politics of security and defence in Europe: national and EU perspectives

think.taylorandfrancis.com

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · 2mo ago

🛡️ As Europe rearms, who defends it — the state, or society too? Comparing Sweden, Germany and France, Berndtsson, Kruck and Weiss find countries with a history of inclusive defence policy bring society in, while others build capacity top-down. 🔗 doi.org/10.1080/0140...

First page of the article “Bringing society (back) in? Defence transformations across Europe in the Zeitenwende” by Joakim Berndtsson, Andreas Kruck and Moritz Weiss, published online first in West European Politics. The page shows the title, the authors, and the abstract.

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · 2mo ago

📈 West European Politics now has a Scopus CiteScore of 9.7. This places it in the top 10 of 745 journals in Political Science & International Relations. 🎉 Thanks to our authors, reviewers, and readers! 🔗 www.scopus.com/sourceid/25691

scopus.com

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · 2mo ago

🇪🇺 What kind of Europe do Europeans want? Hanspeter Kriesi & @ztruchlewski.bsky.social surveyed 16 countries at the 2024 EU elections. ~80% want harder EU external borders, but they split almost evenly on pooling more power centrally. 🔗 doi.org/10.1080/0140...

First page of the article "What kind of Europe do Europeans want?" by Hanspeter Kriesi and Zbigniew Truchlewski, published open access online first in West European Politics. It shows the title, authors, and abstract, which argues that EU preferences are better captured by two dimensions — binding (centralising competences at the EU centre) and bounding (bordering at the EU level) — than by the usual "more or less integration".

Figure 1 from the article: two coefficient plots, one for "binding" and one for "bounding", showing regression coefficients with confidence intervals for individual-level predictors including EU knowledge, immigration and redistribution attitudes, EU trust, left-right position, and populism. In the text, populism is among the strongest predictors of bounding, the left leans pro-binding while the right leans pro-bounding, and education has little effect on either.

Figure 2 from the article: four panels of predicted margins showing how the effects of EU attitudes and ideological orientations on bounding and binding change with EU knowledge. The effects of pro-EU integration attitudes, EU trust (on bounding), and immigration attitudes (on binding) grow as EU knowledge rises, while the effect of populism on bounding shrinks among the more knowledgeable.

Chris Prosser @caprosser.com · 2mo ago

Really delighted to be joining the editorial board of West European Politics - an excellent journal and home to one of my first publications as a grad student and my series of articles on the 2015-24 UK general elections - in excellent company too!

West European Politics@wepsocial.bsky.social · 2mo ago

🎉 We are delighted to welcome 16 new members to the West European Politics Editorial Advisory Board! Joining us are: Marius Busemeyer, @mbusuioc.bsky.social, @hildecoffe.bsky.social, @antoanetadl.bsky.social, @martingross.bsky.social, Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, @wmjunk.bsky.social…

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · 2mo ago

Wiebke Marie Junk @wmjunk.bsky.social · 2mo ago

If you are working on security and defence policy, consider submitting to this important special issue in @wepsocial.bsky.social think.taylorandfrancis.com/special_issu...

Symposium: The New Politics of Security and Defence in Europe: National and EU Perspectives

Symposium: The new politics of security and defence in Europe: national and EU perspectives

think.taylorandfrancis.com

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · 2mo ago

🇨🇿 Was the 2025 Czech election a rupture — or a long trend continued? Radek Buben & @karelkouba.bsky.social read it as less a break than a culmination, as a campaign fought over culture wars, not the economy, put a far-right party in government for the first time. 🔗 doi.org/10.1080/0140...

First page of the article "The 2025 Czech parliamentary election" by Radek Buben and Karel Kouba, published online first in West European Politics. Shows the title, authors and abstract.

West European Politics @wepsocial.bsky.social · 2mo ago

📊 Does it matter how well "people like you" are represented? Lucca Hoffeller & @nilssteiner.bsky.social Steiner find that the further a government's positions sit from someone's occupational class preferences, the lower that person's satisfaction with democracy. 🔗 doi.org/10.1080/0140...

First page of the article "Group-based congruence and political support" by Lucca Hoffeller and Nils D. Steiner, published online first in West European Politics. Shows the title, authors and abstract.

Dot plot showing, for each cabinet, the mean distance between members of different occupational classes and the government's position, averaged across four policy issues (redistribution, immigration, EU integration and social lifestyle).

Line plots showing predicted satisfaction with democracy (with 95% confidence intervals) declining as the distance between an occupational class's preferences and the government's position grows, shown across separate policy domains and an overall measure.