Benjamin Blumenthal

@bnjmnblmnthl.bsky.social

now: FNRS & ECARES (ULB) | past: ETH, PSE (PhD) | game theory, pol econ, org econ | accountability, lobbying, etc. | minions enthusiast site: https://bnjmnblmnthl.github.io/

🚨Davide Cipullo, Tommaso Colussi, Domenico Rossignoli and I are excited to open the call for the 2nd UniCatt Political Economy workshop! We have 2 great keynotes: Alessandra Casella and David Yanagizawa-Drott. Send us your papers (theory or empirics) and let us meet in Milano on December 18.

BildBild

The latest econ scandal is another opportunity for non-econ people to smugly assert that econ is not, in fact, a rigorous endeavour; that it's merely about repeating what others have said; or giving ideological arguments a veneer of rigour. I suppose it's good to see that some things don’t change.

Hilarious to see Macron once again trying to pretend that working conditions for researchers in France have not (further) worsened under his presidency. Europe -- and France in particular -- should get their act together on research rather than launch glossy but empty schemes.

Here in France, research is a priority, innovation is a culture, and science is a boundless horizon. Researchers from around the world, choose France, choose Europe! See you on May 5.

→ http://choosefrance.fr/forscience

Are lobbyists influential? The public sure thinks so, but applied political science since lobbying registration data emerged (late 90s) struggled to produce evidence that it does. In new review @wmjunk.bsky.social @heathbrown.bsky.social and I chart a wave of research showing that lobbying matters.

How Lobbying Matters | Annual Reviews

For decades, political scientists have struggled to provide empirical evidence that lobbying influences policymaking. A considerable gap arose between widespread public suspicions of lobbying and the ...

annualreviews.org

among the best interactions I’ve had in an interview: a *game theorist* asking me whether we do not already have *too many* models, before asking me about the possibility of designing *new* mechanism design/voting procedures for political inefficiencies.