Dina Balabanova

@dinabalabanova.bsky.social

Professor Health Systems & Policy @LSHTM I strive to support action on anti-corruption/improved governance in health systems, people-centred care (non-communicable disease) and resilience.

When harm becomes routine, we must look beyond individual wrongdoing to the power relations that enable, reward, and normalise it. A thought linking our @bmj.com piece to the new @lancetgh.bsky.social Commission on anti-corruption @dinabalabanova.bsky.social @martinmckee.bsky.social y.social

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The BMJ@bmj.com · last mo.

Needed change to the #GlobalHealth architecture will not be achieved by organisational reform alone. Instead, social murder in the current political economy must be confronted. NEW in The BMJ: https://bit.ly/4vPYrGH Part of the Geopolitics of Global Health series: https://bit.ly/4gW3gut

A key piece on the role of health policy and systems research #HSPR given the increasing complexity of health systems and fragmented forces influencing health. Its more extensive use to answer policy questions is urgent @meikeschleiff.bsky.social @martinmckee.bsky.social @eleanorhutch.bsky.social

Tolib Mirzoev@tolibmirzoev.bsky.social · 3mo ago

Interested in the #HPSR? Check out our reflections on its thematic, methodological and value trends from @hsglobal.bsky.social and @alliancehpsr.bsky.social. @lucygilson.bsky.social @dinabalabanova.bsky.social @robertmarten.bsky.social @hsr-lshtm.bsky.social www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....

7/ We provide evidence that system reforms can cut corruption and improve equity (e.g. procurement reform, formal co‑payments with exemptions, disclosure of industry payments). But we must treat corruption as a public health issue: fix systems, not just people — and protect the poorest first.

6/ IWhat does work better: ✅ system‑wide financing reform ✅ reliable salaries & working conditions ✅ transparent digital procurement ✅ enforceable rules ✅ civil society oversight — all adapted to local context.

5/ This means transparency or punishment alone won’t work (although it has an important role). Standalone audits, sanctions, or naming‑and‑shaming often fail, or simply displace corruption elsewhere.

4/ Why corruption persists: • Underfunded systems • Low or delayed salaries • Political patronage • Weak accountability • Normalised “survival practices” • Silence & fear of speaking out Punishment alone won’t fix this.

3/ Key insight: stop seeing corruption as only “bad individuals” (although they exist, even at highest levels of govt). It’s a system failure, often driven by poor pay, weak accountability, political incentives, underfunding, and normalised “survival practices”.

3/5 Absenteeism doesn’t just disrupt services. It redistributes emotional labour. Workers report exhaustion, frustration, isolation, and moral distress, especially where accountability is weak or uneven.

2/5 Using qualitative research in Nigerian PHC facilities we found that unscheduled colleague absenteeism dramatically increases workload, emotional strain, and burnout for remaining staff.

Join us for this excellent event - highly relevant to many countries experiencing crises and governance disruptions. We look forward to constructive dialogue @martinmckee.bsky.social

Governance & Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence (GI ACE)@giace.bsky.social · 5mo ago

📣 Join us this Thursday (16 April) for a #GIACE online seminar: ‘Addressing corruption in crisis situations: towards effective crisis-responses in the Malawian health system’. 🗓️ Thursday 16 April 🕰️ 1pm to 2pm (UK) 🔗 Register now: bit.ly/4bOGhx4

11/ The bottom line: Fix governance → strengthen accountability → reduce corruption → improve PHC performance. Without this chain, PHC reforms will not deliver. You can read the whole paper here: www.tandfonline.com/toc/khsr20/5/4

Health Systems & Reform

Financing Common Goods for Health, sponsored by the World Health Organization, Department of Health Systems Governance and Financing. Volume 5, Issue 4 of Health Systems & Reform

tandfonline.com

10/ As Nigeria moves to implement the Supreme Court ruling granting local government areas fiscal autonomy, these findings are timely—and essential. Strengthening subnational governance is the foundation for effective PHC.

9/ We argue that investments like the government's Basic health care Provision fund must be accompanied by reforms in governance, accountability, HR systems, and financing mechanisms. Otherwise, resources risk being wasted.

8/ The result? A system where corruption is not an individual failing but a structural outcome of weak subnational governance. Reforms that ignore this reality, however well‑intentioned, will fall short.

7/ Fourth, erratic PHC financing. With little statutory financing from subnational authorities, many facilities survive on user fees and “private practice” by those in charge This de facto privatization creates perverse incentives and deepens inequities.

6/ Third, dysfunctional human resource management. Chronic absenteeism, unchecked use of informal “volunteers,” and non‑tenured facility managers turning facilities into personal enterprises, all thrive in the absence of oversight.

5/ Second, weak rules and enforcement. Regulations exist on paper but are rarely communicated, operationalised, or enforced. Many facilities have no functional SOPs, enabling impunity, absenteeism, and arbitrary decision‑making.

4/ First, low political interest in PHC. Local authorities often deprioritize PHC because it brings few political rewards. Budgets are unpredictable, planning is weak, and investments favor visible infrastructure over basic services.

3/ We interviewed senior PHC managers and identified four major governance deficiencies driving corruption and weak service delivery at the frontline. These problems are systemic, predictable, and fixable.

🧵1/ Our new study in Health Systems & Reform describes how poor accountability and corruption in Nigeria’s primary healthcare (PHC) are rooted in subnational governance failures, and not just actions by those working on the frontline. This matters hugely for current reforms.