Horacio Larreguy

@hlarreguy.bsky.social

Working on misinformation, political economy, and development. @ITAM_mx @JPAL and often revisiting @IASToulouse and TSE. Formerly at @Harvard. @MITEcon PhD.

I truly wonder if there is an experiment behind this, this is a joke, or there is an increasingly complete lack of appreciation for our time. They ask to review a book of 350 pages within 15 days for 50 points (worthless to me).

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💥 Our results indicate that after the sudden increase in dissent, municipalities with a stronger militia presence experienced more repression events and less land redistribution than areas with weaker or no militia presence.

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💎We then test these predictions using novel data from twentieth-century Mexico under PRI rule. Our empirical strategy exploits a sharp increase in overall dissent in the mid-1960s and three sources of subnational variation:

🧩 We develop a model in which an autocrat’s localized response to dissent depends on incomplete information about the geography of people’s discontent and the government’s coercive capacity, a feature that authoritarian governments often inherit from the past.

🗺️ In contrast, we argue that subnational differences in the inherited coercive capacity of the regime are a central—yet underexplored—determinant of whether autocrats respond to local dissent with repression or redistribution, thereby preventing its escalation at the very early stages of uprisings.

👉While this trade-off is well documented, existing accounts often treat this strategic choice as uniform across space, attributing variation primarily to national-level factors, such as regime type or macroeconomic conditions.

🤔What could explain the subnational variation in authoritarian responses to local unrest? 📜 Authoritarian regimes commonly employ a mix of coercion and redistribution to maintain political control (Gandhi 2008; Albertus 2017).