Joshua Tallis

@doctallis.bsky.social

Naval and maritime strategy | Director, research program on ally and partner security affairs | Author of War for Muddy Waters: Pirates, Terrorists, Traffickers, and Maritime Insecurity

Last week I joined Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty for a wide ranging conversation on the Strait. We talked about the security environment, commercial vs mil incentives, coercion in diplomacy, and what it really means to restore freedom of navigation in the Gulf. www.rferl.org/a/hormuz-str...

Reopening Hormuz Strait Easier Than Restoring Confidence, Naval Analyst Tallis Says

With the US and Iran launching fresh strikes in the Middle East, the Strait of Hormuz is back under the spotlight. Naval strategist Joshua Tallis says restoring commercial confidence -- not military f...

rferl.org

“"It was a tactical and operational victory and a strategic draw, if not a strategic defeat," said Joshua Tallis, a naval analyst at research firm CNA.” A 🧵 on the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz, and what they teach us about the commercial variable in war at sea. www.reuters.com/business/ene...

Western powers were unable to secure shipping in the Red Sea. Hormuz will be harder

The Western allies trying to negotiate a way to protect the Strait of Hormuz for energy shipping face a stark reality: a similar effort in the Red Sea that started years earlier cost billions of dolla...

reuters.com

“President Donald Trump on Tuesday said that “if necessary”, the US Navy would escort tankers through the strait “as soon as possible”. The US Development Finance Corporation would also provide risk insurance and guarantees for tankers travelling in the Gulf “at a very reasonable price”.

Military briefing: how Iran could wage a new ‘tanker war’

Attacks in the Strait of Hormuz echo the 1980s conflict. Here are the weapons Tehran can use against commercial shipping

ft.com

It’s live! The U.S. Navy Fighting Instructions are ADM Caudle’s thesis on how the Navy adapts to dynamic adversaries. They are how the Navy builds a repeatable process to organize, train, and equip a force that is capable of deterring a fight and ending one.

Bild

In 2019 I published a book on maritime insecurity, and in particular the challenge of aligning constabulary ways with military means. I argued at the time that, as maritime security threats rose in sophistication, it would be increasingly appealing to apply military resources to counter them.

The War for Muddy Waters: Pirates, Terrorists, Traffickers, and Maritime Insecurity

The War for Muddy Waters: Pirates, Terrorists, Traffickers, and Maritime Insecurity [Tallis, Joshua] on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. The War for Muddy Waters: Pirates, Terrorists, Traffickers, and Maritime Insecurity

amazon.com

This @warontherocks.bsky.social article offers a valuable, skeptical assessment of how transformative first-person view (FPV) drones have been on the Ukrainian battlefield—and is a great illustration of why it matters to collect data on the ground.

I Fought in Ukraine and Here’s Why FPV Drones Kind of Suck - War on the Rocks

In 2024 and 2025, I served for six months as an international volunteer on a first-person view attack drone team in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. My team

warontherocks.com

As the kinetic nature of the Israeli strikes on Iran capture attention, there are also other impacts across the maritime space, particularly looking at energy and commercial SLOCs, worth tracking.

It was a pleasure to rejoin the Sailor Pulse podcast to talk about the good, bad, and indifferent in Navy’s “fight from the MOC” journey. This was an interesting and fun discussion that reflects the underlying aspirations and frustrations in how fleet commanders envision the role of MOCs in war.

War on the Rocks@warontherocks.bsky.social · last yr.

Maritime Operations Centers were created with clear ambitions. But how often do those goals match reality? Listen here: warontherocks.com/ep...

I’ve rarely seen a command execute thoughtful in-stride campaign analysis. This should be a five alarm concern for CCDRs, the inability to monitor and self-assess operational level progress turns a four star into chief tactician instead of the strategic leader they’ve been selected to be.

Dr. Jonathan Schroden@jjschroden.bsky.social · last yr.

I worked at CENTCOM for 4 years in the 2000s trying to help them improve their assessment capabilities/approaches. If there’s one thing that command is NOT good at, it’s devising metrics that actually measure effectiveness

From me in Defense News: The recent maritime EO mandated 90-day assessment of how allies and trade policy relate to domestic shipbuilding. I have some ideas, and they start with weighing our strengths (innovation, software, tech) against our allies (huge preexisting maritime capital expenditures).

Defense News@defensenews.bsky.social · last yr.

Opinion: As officials consider the wholesale resuscitation of U.S. shipbuilding, there is a nearer-term lever worth pulling, the author of this op-ed argues.