Eliana Johns

@elianajjohns.bsky.social

Senior Research Associate with Nuclear Information Project @ Federation of American Scientists & Grad Student @ Georgetown SFS | Talks about nukes and satellite imagery | (views are my own)

🚨 Ballistic missile submarines have long been the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad. Is AI changing that baseline? Read the latest from @elianajjohns.bsky.social & Barret Schlegelmilch on how rapid developments in AI and autonomous sensing affect stealth, SSBN survivability, and deterrence:

AI and the Hunt for Ballistic Missile Submarines - The Council on Strategic Risks

With the emergence of low-cost, real-time machine learning and unprecedented investment in AI research, it is worth revisiting the extent to which AI may impact the detectability of what is commonly c...

councilonstrategicrisks.org

I published an update on developments we've been tracking at RAF Lakenheath. While progress (such as the construction of a new security perimeter) is evident, outstanding infrastructure upgrades raise questions about whether U.S. nuclear weapons have already been deployed. fas.org/publication/...

Incomplete Upgrades at RAF Lakenheath Raise Questions About Suspected US Nuclear Deployment - Federation of American Scientists

Satellite imagery of RAF Lakenheath reveals new construction of a security perimeter around ten protective aircraft shelters in the designated nuclear area, the latest measure in a series of upgrades ...

fas.org

Check out @mknight.bsky.social's epic and rather timely report on presidential sole authority in the United States! It has everything you need to know about the history and ongoing debates about this policy -- a must-read!

Mackenzie Knight-Boyle@mknight.bsky.social · 12mo ago

The president has sole authority to order nuclear use- How did we get here? How does it work? What’s the issue? Can we solve it? My new @scientistsorg.bsky.social report on nuclear launch authority in the U.S. - “All the King’s Weapons” - is out! Read it below 👇 fas.org/publication/...

Impressive piece of work by my colleagues @mattkorda.bsky.social and @mknight.bsky.social on the extraordinary mess in the new Sentinel ICBM program: The Two-Hundred Billion Dollar Boondoggle. 👇

Matt Korda@mattkorda.bsky.social · last yr.

An administration that claims to be obsessed with eliminating waste should look no further than the Sentinel ICBM program. @mknight.bsky.social and I have done a deep dive into the system; we explore why the program is so behind schedule, over-budget, and poorly managed. 👇 fas.org/publication/...

Summer camp counselor? ❌ FAS OSINT Bootcamp counselor ✅🗺️ I’m at a loss for words to express how thankful and inspired I am by the success of our inaugural FAS Open Source Nuclear Analysis Bootcamp. I'm already looking forward to next year!

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🆕 Planning for the Unthinkable: the targeting strategies of nuclear-armed states Intense secrecy around nuclear targeting means that most individuals—including lawmakers—do not have much understanding of how fateful decisions about what to target during wartime are made.

Planning for the Unthinkable: The targeting strategies of nuclear-armed states The quantitative and qualitative enhancements to global nuclear arsenals in the past decade—particularly China’s nuclear buildup, Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling, and NATO’s response—have recently reinvigorated debates about how nuclear-armed states intend to use their nuclear weapons, and against which targets, in what some describe as a new Cold War. 

Details about who, what, where, when, why, and how countries target with their nuclear weapons are some of states’ most closely held secrets. Targeting information rarely reaches the public, and discussions almost exclusively take place behind closed doors—either in the depths of military headquarters and command posts, or in the halls of defense contractors and think tanks. The general public is, to a significant extent, excluded from those discussions. This is largely because nuclear weapons create unique expectations and requirements about secrecy and privileged access that, at times, can seem borderline undemocratic. Revealing targeting information could open up a country’s nuclear policies and intentions to intense scrutiny by its adversaries, its allies, and—crucially—its citizens. 

This presents a significant democratic challenge for nuclear-armed countries and the international community. Despite the profound implications for national and international security, the intense secrecy means that most individuals—not only including the citizens of nuclear-armed countries and others that would bear the consequences of nuclear use, but also lawmakers in nuclear-armed and nuclear umbrella states that vote on nuclear weapons programs and policies—do not have much understanding of how countries make fateful decisions about what to target during wartime, and how. When lawmakers in nuclear-armed countries approve military spending bills that enhance or increase nuclear and conventional forces, they often do so with little knowledge of how those bills could have implications for nuclear targeting plans.

Want to learn more about who controls one of the most powerful nuclear arsenals in the world??? Check out this excellent piece in @postopinions.bsky.social by my good friend and colleague, @mknight.bsky.social!

Mackenzie Knight-Boyle@mknight.bsky.social · last yr.

Really proud of my new piece on the president’s nuclear launch authority for our team @scientistsorg.bsky.social’s Next Nuclear Age series in @washingtonpost.com ! Unfortunately it turned out to be quite a timely one. Give it a read ⬇️⬇️⬇️

My latest: @projectsyndicate.bsky.social asked me (and four other analysts) to offer our thoughts on whether US allies should begin thinking about building their own nuclear weapons. My answer: as bad as things look now, proliferation can make things worse. www.project-syndicate.org/magazine/tru...

A New Nuclear Calculus?

Thorsten Benner, et al consider whether America's friends and allies should pursue their own nuclear-weapons capabilities.

project-syndicate.org