Matteo Godi

@matteogodi.bsky.social

law prof teaching torts @ USC Gould; ex appellate lawyer papers: https://ssrn.com/author=2801309

Now that the movers have left I guess it’s really happening? Excited to be visiting at YLS this fall! If you’re passing through New Haven, come say hi!! (And if you’re in my ConLaw class, I’ll see you at 8AM next Tuesday — check your inbox later today for the readings 🤓)

Screenshot of Noah Rosenblum’s visiting faculty page at Yale Law School

It was wonderful to be back at Yale Law School today to present a working paper at the Yale-Toronto-Columbia Private Law Theory annual conference. I can't say I missed Pepe's pizza, but it was so nice to see some old (and older!) friends!

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Beginning in 2020, the Supreme Court sent two signals it was easing off its qualified immunity crusade: 1) its decision in Taylor v. Riojas, holding qi should be denied for obvious violations, even if no case on point; 2) slowing its shadow docket qi reversals. Does Zorn mark the end of #2?

Mark Joseph Stern@mjsdc.bsky.social · 7mo ago

By an apparent 6–3 vote, the Supreme Court grants qualified immunity to an officer who performed a painful "rear wristlock" on a nonviolent protester during a sit-in, summarily reversing the 2nd Circuit. All three liberals dissent—here's the gist of it: www.supremecourt.gov/orders/court...

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and
JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting.
Sergeant Jacob Zorn used a “‘pain compliance technique’” called a rear wristlock on Shela Linton, a nonviolent
protestor who was peacefully demonstrating at a sit-in in
the Vermont capitol. 135 F. 4th 19, 24–25 CA2 (2025). The
Second Circuit held that Zorn was not entitled to qualified
immunity on Linton’s Fourth Amendment excessive force
claim, at least at the summary judgment stage, because
prior Circuit precedent had clearly established that using a
rear wristlock against a nonviolent protestor would violate
the protestor’s constitutional rights. That decision was not
erroneous, and certainly not so clearly erroneous as to warrant the “extraordinary remedy of a summary reversal.”
Major League Baseball Players Assn. v. Garvey, 532 U. S.
504, 512–513 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). I respectfully
dissent.

Does anyone have an article or other publication with the text of a bill to create liability for federal law enforcement officers? Not just what's wrong with the current situation but a proposed bill?

Federal officers do not have absolute immunity, but there is a web of doctrines that make civil suits against them nearly impossible to bring successfully. Congress knew they needed to fix this in 2020, and new reasons why they should are coming fast and furious now. www.politico.com/news/magazin...

Opinion | The Simple Way Congress Can Stop Federal Officials from Abusing Protesters

The Supreme Court gave people the right to sue federal officials for violating their rights. Now is the time for Congress to make it law.

politico.com

Regardless of whose “fault” this is (firms blame schools; schools blame firms), everyone can agree this makes zero sense. My 1Ls were worrying about applying for 2L summer jobs (not a typo) even before we read Palsgraf—and they were asked to fly out for callbacks in the middle of 1L fall finals!

Reuters Legal@legal.reuters.com · 10mo ago

In a first, many top law firms this year are recruiting summer associates during students' first semester. Some are dangling ‘jumbo offers’ and ‘loyalty’ bonuses for students who do two summer stints back-to-back, keeping them out of other firms' reach reut.rs/44U44cD

Erin and I had been talking about how much we missed fall here in LA…until last week, when fall reached to the two beautiful maple trees outside our home and the piles of leaves appeared. Still mildly strange to use a leaf blower in 81F weather, but a much needed break from exam writing!

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I joined Short Circuit (@shortcircuitij.bsky.social) to discuss my forthcoming article, Section 1983: A Strict Liability Statutory Tort (@califlrev.bsky.social). If you’re into civil rights litigation, qualified immunity, or tort theory, check it out! Here's a thread about the basic argument (1/8)

Short Circuit 403 | Strict Liability for Civil Rights Violations - Institute for Justice

In a special episode, IJ’s Anya Bidwell interviews Matteo Godi of USC Law about his new article “Section 1983: A Strict Liability Statutory Tort.” Professor […]

ij.org

It's worth asking how differently things might look on the ground right now if #SCOTUS hadn't eviscerated Bivens—and made it all-but impossible to bring damages suits against federal officers (like ICE agents) who violate our constitutional rights. This is from my rebuttal in Hernández v. Mesa:

I do want to go back to putting this case in the broader context because I think it's important to understand how we got here. Historically, the whole way that the tort liability regime worked for government misconduct was that this Court and state courtslooked to existing common law causes of action and focused on immunity defenses as the way of calibrating the harm that citizens and others faced when injured by government officers against the need to protect officers acting in good faith, back to Judge Hand in Gregoire
versus Biddle. 

The Court struck this balance by fashioning immunity defenses where the fight would be over whether the officer was entitled to immunity or not. And for law enforcement officers specifically, this Court has long
rejected the argument that there should be any context in which law enforcement officers, because of the frequency with which they
interact with average individuals, because of the nature of their interactions, because of the powers they have to search, to seize, to arrest in this context, to use lethal force, did not justify absolute immunity and instead justified a more narrower, qualified kind of immunity for those most likely to come face-to-face with private citizens.

Distilled to its simplest, the government's position in this case is thatofficers in what is self-described as the nation's largest law enforcement agency should have a functional absolute immunity at least where foreign nationals are concerned.

And our submission is that that is not consistent with how this Court has always understood the relationship between causes of action and immunity defenses in this context. It is not required by any of this Court's Bivens decisions. It does not abide by this Court's suggestion in Abbasi that there are strong reasons and powerful reasons to retain Bivens in this context.

And it would eliminate the one deterrence that is meaningfully available to ensure that officers in the nation's largest law enforcement agency are complying with the law.