Tessera

Understanding whether consciousness depends on computational roles, biological realizers, or both, is crucial for assessing the prospects of consciousness in AI and less complex animals. end/

subcomputational biological realizers favors consciousness in simpler animals. Current theories of consciousness are 'meat-neutral', but if specific physical substrates are necessary, AI may never achieve consciousness. 3/

processes, are necessary for consciousness. By contrasting computational roles with their subcomputational biological realizers, I show that there is a systematic tension in our criteria for consciousness: prioritizing computational roles favors consciousness in AI, while prioritizing 2/

Computational functionalism claims that executing certain computations is sufcient for consciousness, regardless of the physical mechanisms implementing those computations. This view neglects a compelling alternative: that subcomputational biological mechanisms, which realize computational 1/

Can Only Meat Machines be Conscious? New paper in Trends in Cognitive Sciences, free download until November 26 with this URL: authors.elsevier.com/a/1luwh4sIRv...

authors.elsevier.com

Angela Potochnik @apotochnik.bsky.social · last yr.

See tiny red line of link to today's actual news

I’m shocked my book is on this list. But, cool! Great company.

Brian Weatherson@bweatherson.bsky.social · last yr.

While waiting for the cricket to start, I thought I'd see what the citation data said about this question. Which new-ish books have been cited at the highest rate in philosophy journals in recent years. brian.weatherson.org/quarto/blog/...

Consciousness before birth? Imaging studies explore the possibility | Science | AAAS www.science.org/content/arti...

Consciousness before birth? Imaging studies explore the possibility

Fetal and infant brains offer clues to when human experience begins

science.org

Goodby global workspace and higher order theories

First order theories of consciousness win again

direct.mit.edu/jocn/article...

EEG Decoding of Conscious versus Unconscious Representations during Binocular Rivalry

Abstract. Theories of visual awareness often fall into two general categories, those assuming that awareness arises rapidly within visual cortex and those assuming that awareness arises more slowly as...

direct.mit.edu

Matthias Michel @matthiasmichel.bsky.social · 2y ago

Excellent interview of @neddo.bsky.social (www.youtube.com/watch?v=wM1f...)

Ned Block: Consciousness, Artificial Intelligence, and the Philosophy of Mind

YouTube video by Robinson Erhardt

youtube.com

hakwan lau @hakwan.bsky.social · 2y ago

authors.elsevier.com/a/1kHSZ4sIRv... in this short letter in TICS, @matthiasmichel.bsky.social & @jorge-morales.bsky.social argue against the episodic memory deficit interpretation of aphantasia proposed by @andreablomkvist.bsky.social. a lack of imagery awareness may be all there is 1/2

authors.elsevier.com

hakwan lau @hakwan.bsky.social · 2y ago

since @neddo.bsky.social & i so rarely agree on anything other than restaurant choices, this is possibly legit 2/2

Jorge Morales @jorgemorales.me · 2y ago

I should add that even though we do offer a possible alternative reading of the data to the one offered by @andreablomkvist.bsky.social, her work on aphantasia remains some of the best on the subject. If you’re interested in the topic, you should read her work. bsky.app/profile/hakw...

hakwan lau@hakwan.bsky.social · 2y ago

Jorge Morales @jorgemorales.me · 2y ago

Short letter in TiCS where we (@matthiasmichel.bsky.social, @hakwan.bsky.social & @neddo.bsky.social) explore the possibility that aphantasia is unconscious mental imagery. Given aphantasics’ high performance, we propose thinking about it as blindsight of the mind’s eye. www.cell.com/trends/cogni...

Aphantasia as imagery blindsight

In a recent article in TiCS [1], Zeman provided a masterful and balanced review of aphantasia. However, in doing so, he might have been too generous to some accounts. Specifically, unlike Zeman, we consider the view that aphantasia involves nonconscious imagistic representations [2] to be clearly superior to other views. Here, we argue against these other views as they were described by Zeman. In addition, we address some additional arguments that have been raised to counter the idea that aphantasia involves nonconscious imagistic representations [3], which were not addressed by Zeman in his review.

cell.com

Heather Cox Richardson on the events in South Korea today: "The events in Seoul also cemented the shift in social media from X to Bluesky, where news was breaking faster than anywhere else, in a way that echoed what Twitter used to be."

@matthiasmichel.bsky.social share with Hakwan Lau, Axel Cleeremans and others. Your reply is that the unconscious visual state causes feelings or imagery states that cause a high confidence higher order monitoring state that [?] comes after the first order state. Maybe. But this is an ad hoc/2

@matthiasmichel.bsky.social I said the new blindsight data suggests that the patient has an unconscious first order perceptual representation accompanied by a higher order cognitive monitoring state about the first order state. That is a counterexample to the higher order monitoring theory you/1

This metacognitive awareness without first order awareness is a problem for higher order pointer views. They will have to say that the particular kind of metacognitive awareness is not the kind that makes a first order state conscious. Sounds ad hoc.

academic.oup.com/cercor/advan... Analysis of recordings of conversations with the only carefully studied bilateral human blindsight patient reveals that he knows he is seeing red without, apparently, perceptual phenomenology of redness. 1/

On the bright side of blindsight. Considerations from new observations of awareness in a blindsight patient

Abstract. Blindsight refers to the ability to make accurate visual discriminations without conscious awareness of the stimuli. In this study, we present ne

academic.oup.com