Shelley Clark

@shelleydclark.bsky.social

James McGill Professor of Sociology, McGill University. A demographer whose research focuses on gender, health, family dynamics, and life course transitions. https://www.mcgill.ca/sociology/contact-us/faculty/clark

To the Anemona Hartocollis's credit, this article does not use the term "fertility crisis," which is good because there is. not. one. -- contrary to the clickbait bosses at NYT. When you say "fertility crisis," and then liberals can't "solve" it, you are left negotiating over the Nazi solutions.

A Conservative Role Model for Ending the Fertility Crisis

Emma Waters, pregnant with her third child, is crafting policy
to encourage early parenthood. Some think she is pushing an
ideology that does not meet reality.

This is a small center w/in a larger institute, which means that if you (for example) want to attend the weekly research seminar, you’ll be one of ~40+ people in person (all enjoying a nice free lunch), which i think is really fun. This is also why there’s a critical mass for, like, bike tune-up day

Communications job in the population health world. This is at an institute where I work that has a great culture and strong support for work-life balance. (I‘ll be working a bit with whoever ends up in the role!) Note that relevant work experience can replace educational background qualifications.

hr.myu.umn.edu

One thing I'd particularly want to highlight, since so many discussions of the future of family life get it wrong. People are very quick to look at *delayed* childbearing, as parents wait until later in adulthood, and think they're seeing a *refusal* of childbearing.

Leech: There’s a growing narrative that declining fertility
reflects people “opting out” of parenthood. What does the
data actually tell us about whether people don’t want children
— versus when they feel able to have them?

Clark: What the evidence suggests is that this is much more
about when than whether. Over the past 30 years in Canada, the
proportion of women who reach the end of their reproductive
years without having children has increased only slightly — from
about 14% to 17%. That’s not a dramatic change.
What has changed significantly is timing. People are waiting
longer to have children, and many are having fewer. We won’t
fully know whether today’s delays translate into permanent
childlessness until younger generations reach later life, but
right now the data points much more strongly to postponement
rather than rejection.

Worth noting that when people cite that religiosity is associated with greater fertility across nations (with the implication being we should increase religiosity HERE to increase our fertility rates), that link apparently only applies in non-Christian regions. In fact, W. Europe it's the opposite.

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newrepublic.com/article/2040... New by UMd demographer @philipncohen.com in TNR, on the pronatalist panic. Some key lines: "giving in to population panic and endorsing a plan to increase birth rates implicitly supports anti-immigration politics and yields ground to racist fearmongering.” 1/

What If Both Sides in the Birth Rate Debate Are Wrong?

The right wants to steer women away from work and toward motherhood. The left wants to provide them with more state support so it’s easier to have children. We should refuse this choice.

newrepublic.com

Answer #2: When using the Supplemental Poverty Rate, we find that rural child poverty rates have fallen, particularly post 2017. Broadly speaking, this progress on poverty is unexpected since rural kids are increasingly living in nonmarital families, which normally have high risks of poverty.

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Answer #1: Rural kids are increasingly NOT living in married parent families. Instead they are increasingly living with cohabiting parents, never married parents, and with no parents (kinship care). This shift away from married families has happened at much faster pace for rural than urban kids.

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