FPA Journal

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Foreign Policy Analysis - An International Studies Association (ISA) Journal Editors-in-Chief: Brian Lai & Lisbeth Aggestam

🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨 Hagan (2026) argues that governments in politically fragmented regimes are unlikely to operate coherently during international crises, drawing on the 1914 July Crisis to trace the effects of escalation across five fragmented governments doi.org/10.1093/fpa/...

Title: Coalitions at the Brink of War: How Fragmented Decision-Making Occurs in International Crises—The July 1914 Case
Abstract: Do governments operate coherently during international crises threatening war? This paper argues that this is unlikely in politically fragmented regimes, i.e., parliamentary democracies with coalition cabinets and anocracies with weak, ill-defined centers of authority. Drawing on Oppermann and Brummer (2014), it suggests two pathways by which crises intensify—not diminish—the occurrence of “coalition decision units” composed of competing factions, parties, and/or institutions.. First, because committing to war requires the approval of the full leadership (e.g., cabinet), the “foreign policy executive” (FPE) must gain the support of non-FPE actors opposed to war. Second, when war appears imminent, the FPE itself may split, with some members now advocating diplomatic restraint. Drawing upon the rich literature on the July 1914 crisis, the effects of crisis escalation are traced for the involved powers, all of which entered the crisis with fragmented governments: Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, and Russia.

🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨 Attia and Tama (2026) investigate factors shaping approval of sanctions legislation in the US Congress between 1987 and 2014, finding that legislators are responsive to international contexts when proposing and approving sanctions. doi.org/10.1093/fpa/...

Title: The Domestic and International Sources of Legislative Action on Economic Sanctions
Abstract: When does the U.S. Congress move to impose sanctions on foreign countries? While prior research highlights Congress’s influence on sanctions policy, little is known about what drives legislators to act. This paper investigates factors driving the introduction and approval of sanctions legislation, arguing that the factors shaping sanctions policymaking vary across the different stages of the legislative process. Using a dataset of U.S. sanctions legislation from 1987 to 2014, we run a series of logistic regressions to analyze this two-staged process. While prior work emphasizes the role of domestic interests in driving legislative behavior on sanctions, we find that legislators are also responsive to international conditions. Our analysis shows that legislators are more likely to propose sanctions against countries violating international norms or threatening global security, but less likely to approve them when those countries are major recipients of U.S. exports.

🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨 Minoura (2026) uses a survey experiment to study how donor citizens balance democracy promotion and competition from other donors, finding that US citizens may be willing to compromise on aid conditions but reluctant to outbid competitors. doi.org/10.1093/fpa/...

Title: Drivers of Public Support for Foreign Aid: Democracy Promotion or Competition for Influence? 
Abstract: How do citizens in traditional donor countries balance competing goals of foreign aid: promoting democracy through conditionality versus maintaining influence amid competition from non-traditional donors? This study examines American public support for aid to Africa as Chinese aid expands. It argues that feedback from aid recipients shapes support for aid and conditionality. Using a survey experiment, the study finds that Americans become less supportive of aid when they learn that African recipients oppose democratic conditions, though this information does not significantly change support for attaching such conditions. When paired with information that Africans prefer Chinese aid without conditions, however, Americans become less supportive of democratic conditions. Yet support for aid does not increase; instead, it declines slightly. These findings suggest that when recipients resist US conditionality and signal alignment with a rival donor, Americans become more willing to compromise on conditions but reluctant to enter a bidding war for influence.

🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨 Kovačević, Rečević, Varda, and Milošević (2026) bridge neoclassical realism with role theory to introduce the concept of 'role hedging', illustrating it through Serbia's engagement with the Berlin Process and the Open Balkan Initiative. doi.org/10.1093/fpa/...

Title: Role Hedging and Regional Cooperation: Serbia’s Discourse on the Berlin Process and the Open Balkan Initiative
Abstract: Although the prevalent IR and FPA literature, drawing on neoclassical realism (NCR), focuses on the material aspects of hedging, it largely overlooks identity-driven dynamics, thereby falling short of offering a more wholesome understanding of states’ hedging behaviour. By leveraging an affinity between NCR and role theory in FP research, we argue that identity needs are so deeply intertwined with material considerations that they can themselves constitute primary drivers of hedging moves. The paper introduces the concept of role hedging, capturing how states seek to retain, rather than abandon, their various and often conflicting roles, by managing them either through distribution across different stages (global, regional, subregional), or by strategically shifting between those stages. By focusing on Serbia’s engagement with two regional cooperation frameworks, the Berlin Process and the Open Balkan Initiative, from 2014 to 2024, we illustrate the complexities and tensions in Serbia’s discursive positioning that underpin its precarious hedging repertoire.

🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨 Zabun (2026) suggests that government type, presidential or parliamentary, affects views of democratic leader resolve during international crises, highlighting the importance of domestic institutional structures in shaping perceptions. doi.org/10.1093/fpa/...

Title: Institutions over Individuals: The Role of Government Type in Demonstrating Resolve during International Crises
Abstract: Which government type—presidential or parliamentary—leads adversaries to perceive democratic leaders as more resolved when making militarized threats? While existing literature offers several explanations for demonstrating resolve based on relative capabilities, strategic interests, costly signaling, reputation, and audience costs, I suggest that government type is one of the primary factors affecting how democratic leaders’ resolve is perceived during international crises. My argument is that leaders in presidential systems are more likely to demonstrate resolve than their parliamentary counterparts because presidential systems provide greater autonomy from legislative constraints, more centralized executive authority, and fixed terms with longer tenures, making presidents appear more independent, decisive, and capable of following through on threats. I test this hypothesis in a quantitative analysis using a mixed-effects logistic regression. The findings highlight the importance of domestic institutional structures in shaping the perception of resolve by target states during international crises.

🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨 Malit Jr (2026) focuses on the paradox of South-South labour migration in an anarchic international system, using extensive field observations of the Philippines' case to show how sender states strengthen coalitions and bargaining power. doi.org/10.1093/fpa/...

Title: The Paradox of Cooperative Migration Diplomacy in the Global South: Inter-Sending State Cooperation, Multilevel Diplomacy Strategies, and the Philippine State
Abstract: How and why do sending states in the Global South cooperate under anarchy? Despite their significance, IR scholarship has largely overlooked the sending states’ strategic logic and use of labor migration as a foreign policy tool. Using the Philippine state as a single case study, I argue that Global South sending states strategically manipulate complex interstate power dynamics to solidify inter-sending state coalitions and enhance bargaining power by employing multilevel cooperative diplomacy—bilateral (learning), multilateral (cooperation), and global (positioning). Methodologically, I employ semi-structured interviews (N = 15) with state and non-state actors, process tracing, secondary sources, and decade-long field observations. Rather than viewing migration diplomacy as zero-sum, the Philippine state adopts a positive-sum, human-rights-centered migration diplomacy, fostering global coalition-building while pursuing material and ideational interests. Overall, this study advances IR debates on foreign policy and South–South labor migration by recentering the neglected inter-Global South–South sending-state migration cooperation in an anarchic international system.

🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨 Drożdż (2026) examines Poland's Law and Justice party (PiS) Three Seas Initiative (TSI) to show how populist governments institutionalise their agendas by establishing a counter-elite, finding PiS ultimately failed to do so with the TSI. doi.org/10.1093/fpa/...

Title: Foreign Policy Counter-Elite and Durability of Populist Foreign Policy
Abstract: This article examines how and why populist governments seek to transform foreign policy institutions through the establishment of a counter-elite. It conceptualizes the counter-elite as the missing link between populist power consolidation and the durability of populist foreign policy, arguing that its level of institutionalization determines whether populist foreign policy changes become entrenched or remain reversible.

The framework is applied to Poland under the Law and Justice party (PiS) from 2015 to 2023, using official documents, secondary literature, and anonymized interviews with policymakers and experts. Focusing on PiS’s flagship foreign policy project, the Three Seas Initiative (TSI), the analysis shows that although PiS effectively deinstitutionalized existing foreign policy structures, it failed to build a coherent and self-replicating counter-elite. As a result, foreign policy remained dependent on political incumbency, limiting the institutional reproduction of the populist agenda and leading to the marginalization of the TSI after PiS’s electoral defeat in 2023.

🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨 Altiparmak and Thies (2026) examine interrole conflicts that emerge when rival great powers pressure states into buffer state roles. Using Turkish FP during and after WWII, they show how states navigate demands in the international system. doi.org/10.1093/fpa/...

Title: Navigating Interrole Conflicts and Maneuvering Sovereignty in the Foreign Policy of Buffer States 
Abstract: How do buffer states behave? What factors influence their decision-making? This study answers these questions using the framework of role theory to understand the interrole conflicts that are inherent in the buffer state role and that emerge when at least two opposing great powers and alliances exert pressure on them. By employing the strategies of choice, compromise (alternating and mixing roles), avoidance, and both direct and indirect resolution, this study assesses how buffer states (ego) deal with the demands of those they buffer (significant others, alters). The case of Turkey demonstrates how its foreign policy during and in the immediate aftermath of World War II was shaped by its efforts to avoid being constrained to a buffer role. An analysis of Turkey’s evolving foreign policies illustrates how the behavior of buffer states shapes broader geopolitical trends and highlights the importance of viewing these states as dynamic actors within the international system.

🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨 Onea and AltıntaŞ (2026) explore ally-scaping. Using Turkey's 1964 non-intervention in Cyprus, attributed to US opposition, they show how leaders blame allies for failing to support the state as they try to avoid domestic audience costs. doi.org/10.1093/fpa/...

Title: Scapegoating Your Ally: How Leaders Deflect Audience Costs by Blaming Allies for Not Supporting Them in International Crises 
Abstract: While the literature holds that audience costs tie leaders’ hands, an emerging body of scholarship explores ways in which leaders can strategically circumvent them. However, this research has not considered the strategy of ally-scapegoating or attributing blame to the ally for failing to support the state during crises. Leaders escape penalties for not carrying out threats, while domestic audiences hold the ally responsible. Ally-scapegoating is practiced by leaders who engage in blustering—provoking a crisis and then conceding—for the sake of boosting their domestic standing; and by those who unwarily contract audience costs by blundering into making commitments that are prohibitively expensive to fulfill. Ally-scapegoating is likely under power disparity between allies; and conviction that the ally would turn down requests to provide help. The paper illustrates ally-scapegoating through the 1964 Turkish non-intervention in Cyprus, caused by insufficient naval resources, but successfully blamed on the US opposition.

Following #ISA2026, our editorial team are on the road and in the air✈️. We are catching up with submissions and would love for anyone who presented a Foreign Policy Analysis paper at the conference to consider submitting it to FPA!

🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨 DiLorenzo (2026) tackles the issue of whether increased polarization weakens democratic institutions' stabilising effects on foreign policy, testing this assumption on UNGA voting consistency and alliance abbrogation. Does change occur? doi.org/10.1093/fpa/...

🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨 Peterson and Ai (2026) use commodity trade data, and an opportunity and willingness framework, to unpack ideological and economic factors affecting state condemnation and sanctions policies following 🇷🇺 full-scale invasion of Ukraine 🇺🇦🇺🇦🇺🇦 doi.org/10.1093/fpa/...

🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨 Nguyen (2026) explains how, despite a contentious history and context, Vietnam attaches importance to its bilateral relationship with China, using a relational power framework, providing three propositions to explain these interactions. doi.org/10.1093/fpa/...

Title: Unveiling Relational Power in Foreign Policy: Insights from China–Vietnam Relations
Abstract: This article employs the relational power approach to explain the essence and dynamics of China–Vietnam relations. The bilateral relationship between these two neighboring communist states has remained relatively stable since their diplomatic normalization in 1991. Vietnam has regarded China as a top priority in its foreign policy, despite historical legacies and lingering territorial conflicts in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, China has, at times, tolerated Vietnam’s defiant and confrontational actions during conflicts. Notably, interactions between the two sides frequently restore swiftly following such conflicts. This phenomenon cannot be fully explained by existing hard and soft power theories. The relational power theoretical framework provides three main propositions for explaining China–Vietnam interactions, including prioritizing long-term stability over immediate and apparent material gains, balancing expectations to sustain stability, and a preemptive effect that constrains both sides’ actions. This approach provides a nuanced understanding of their enduring yet complex relationship.