John Johnston

@johnjohnstoned.bsky.social

There's an inconvenient truth for public health leaders who insisted COVID doesn't spread in schools. I mean, not too inconvenient. It's not like there are any standards of professional conduct. Is killing people out of sheer incompetence embarrassing? Or is it too normalized now?

Linsey Marr@linseymarr.bsky.social · 8mo ago

Six-week study of 67 students in four classes, 1047 saliva samples -> "Prolonged exposure in shared, poorly ventilated spaces, which potentially includes several infectious sources, drives respiratory virus transmission more than close contact." www.nature.com/articles/s41... HT: Emily Martin

Poor Public Health leadership in SARS, preoccupied with turf wars and controlling information to gain power instead of doing the job and saving lives poses a key question: Why is that behaviour *so typical* of IPC / PH leaders, fighting to exclude "competitors" like OHS, science, engineering etc?

To some who worked with him during SARS his behaviour appeared puzzling. It seemed to them that he was more preoccupied with his personal authority as Chief Medical Officer of Health than he was with working with others to get the job done. These concerns include the observation that he would make himself unavailable if he felt personally slighted by the presence of someone he considered an intruder on his own turf. His supporters on the other hand suggest that he responded appropriately by staking out the authority of his office in response to the inappropriate presence of outsiders in the management of a public health crisis that by law and by bureaucratic convention was his alone to direct entirely by himself as he saw fit. It is unnecessary to review in detail the different points of view between Dr. D’Cunha and some of his colleagues as to whether he blocked the flow of information in order to assert his status and territory in a complex turf dispute among local health units, the provincial Public Health Branch, the Hospital Division of the Ministry of Health, the federal government, and all the other governmental players necessarily involved. What is abundantly clear, despite Dr. D’Cunha’s recollection that he always shared and never withheld information, is that a contrary body of opinion is held by some who worked with him closely. Perception, in a time of crisis, is as important as fact. Many colleagues ended up with the impression that Dr. D’Cunha felt that knowledge was power and the best way to demonstrate to others that he was in charge of his own turf was to show them that he controlled the flow of information. Having regard to Dr. D’Cunha’s recollection to the contrary this impression may well be inaccurate and may simply reflect misunderstandings. The problem is that, in a crisis, teamwork is essential and any impression that impairs teamwork, whether or not the impression is accurate, can defeat the common effort.

The lack of transparency is another aspect that seems to be permanently baked into the culture of IPC and Public Health. I suspect a consequence of the toxic politics institutional medicine is famous for, with "peacetime generals" wrestling for power and authority.

Problem 3: Lack of Transparency38 Because there was no existing plan in place for a public health emergency like SARS, systems had to be designed from scratch. Ad hoc organizations like the Epi Unit and the Science Committee were cobbled together. Procedures and protocols were rushed into place. There was little opportunity for feedback between the local health units, hospitals and the Provincial Operations Centre that oversaw the effort to contain SARS.A lack of earlier planning and ongoing consultation meant that those working in local health units were often directed by the Provincial Operations Centre to do things for which they thought there was no clear rationale. Many people regarded the Provincial Operations Centre as a full-fledged organization. In fact, it was simply a room that functioned as an operations centre. To local public health units, it was unclear who comprised the Provincial Operations Centre, what they did, how they made their decisions and what was their legal authority for issuing directives. One physician at the Public Health Branch of the Ministry of Health described the confusion as follows: I wanted to know who was in this POC, because when I would call them, they were just saying, you know, POC and I wanted to say like, Who Are You? And, I mean, not that it was a big issue where, you know, you’d imagine major litigation or but it was, it was a huge issue on a day-to-day basis on the clinical side is how do they make these decisions, who’s making them? Another public health professional who worked with the Provincial Operations Centre described how a local Medical Officer of Health was shocked to learn that he was legally responsible for the outcome of the implementation of directives – not the Provincial Operations Centre that issued them:

Noting once again that this wasn't some inevitable Act of God. Public health and infection control leaders decided reading a few papers meant they knew science better than actual scientists, and rejected the reality that COVID is airborne - likely the worst medical error in history.

Chantzy@chantzy.bsky.social · last yr.

There are alarming signals that in some people long Covid cognitive difficulties not only don't improve - but are progressive "It doesn’t look in older adults that this is a reversible process" No paywall 🔗

While reflecting on the complete lack of preparedness for a potential H5N1 pandemic, I came across this 2021 graphic from @jensvb.bsky.social and it couldn't be more accurate. If H5N1 takes off before the public health and IPC leaders who botched the COVID response have been fired, we're toast.

Two drawings of an exponentially increasing curve. On the left, under the title "public health", the curve is sequentially labelled "going down", "under control" and then "OMG exponential growth!". On the right, under the title "scientsts", all three corresponding portions of the curve are labelled "exponential growth".

The image is parodying the inability of public health leaders (who often have little or no advanced science training, but portray themselves as science experts) to predict the scientifically obvious, as repeatedly demonstrated throughout the COVID pandemic.It's not enough to say we have "COVID" under control. 

We are now experiencing multiple parallel variant pandemics, and need to ask whether they are each under control *individually*.

This also illustrates why it's important to teach evolution in schools.

[chart showing clear exponential growth of the Delta variant well before mitigations were dropped in Alberta's "Open for the Summer" initiative - 2% of all unvaccinated Albertans over 70 were killed specifically by COVID over the next 6 months]

Misleading the world about the mode of transmission of the pathogen threatening to “wreak havoc” was inexcusable…. Why have Tedros, Ryan and the WHO never been called to account? …..they haven’t even bothered to offer an excuse for this tragic exchange. Failing to learn allows history to repeat.

Mark Ungrin@mark-ungrin.bsky.social · 2y ago

One of the things COVID has made unmistakably clear is that the Thin White Line protects senior insiders no matter what. A test for the integrity of the essential COVID inquiries will be whether those at the top are called to account, or whether excuses are made for the inexcusable.

Problem 4: Lack of Provincial Public Health Leadership Few worked harder during SARS than Dr. Colin D’Cunha, the Chief Medical Officer of Health for Ontario and Director of the Public Health Branch in the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long- Term Care. He demonstrated throughout the crisis a strong commitment to his belief of what was in the public interest. Dr. D’Cunha is a dedicated professional who has devoted his career to the advancement of public health. However for the brief reasons that follow Dr. D’Cunha turned out in hindsight to be the wrong man in the wrong place at the wrong time. While it may be due to misunderstandings or a simple difficulty on the part of Dr. D’Cunha to communicate effectively, there is a strong consensus on the part of those colleagues who worked with him during the crisis that his highest and best public calling at this time is in an area of public health other than direct programme leadership. This general concern has undoubtedly been reflected in the government’s decision to provide him with other opportunities within his area of expertise. Because Dr. D’Cunha no longer holds the office of Chief Medical Officer of Health it might be asked why it is necessary in this interim report to deal with his leadership during SARS. The answer is that the public has a right to know what happened during SARS and that obliges me to make whatever findings I am taken to by the evidence. The story of what happened during SARS cannot be told without some reference to the difficulties that arose in respect of Dr. D’Cunha’s leadership.

What gave Maria such confidence to speak with such certainty about the mode of transmission? Completely disregard the precautionary principle? Did she not understand the potential consequences of getting it wrong? So many questions to be answered as to why WHO failed to learn from SARS1.

Mark Ungrin@mark-ungrin.bsky.social · 2y ago

🧵 Excerpts from the 2006 report of Canada's SARS Commission. An inquiry into the mismanagement of SARS-CoV-1, it was the most essential read for any competent IPC / Public Health professional attempting to avoid mismanaging SARS-COV-2. So…mostly ignored. www.archives.gov.on.ca/en/e_records...

This report is dedicated to those who died from SARS, those who suffered from it, those who fought the disease, and all those affected by it.

Occupational health experts who understand transmission and the precautionary principle need to replace experts in IPAC “Occupational health standards of control tend to be higher than those in a public health context and can contribute to the good practice of infection control and public health…”

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Prof Raymond Agius@profraymondagius.bsky.social · 2y ago

Bluesky is now my preferred platform for posts. My latest Editorial: “A better approach to mitigate the risk of airborne infections in workplaces“ doi.org/10.1093/occm... TL;DR A ‘let them rip’ attitude towards the mitigation of the risk of common airborne infections in the workplace is unacceptable

📢New UK Government petition just out: "Introduce new air quality and PPE rules for health and social care settings". If you're a British citizen or UK resident it would be great if you could sign it, & even if you're not if you could share it. Thank you! 🙏 petition.parliament.uk/petitions/70...

Petition: Introduce new air quality and PPE rules for health and social care settings

We want the Government to set new rules on air quality and infection control in health and social care settings, to prevent and control airborne infections, with new ventilation and filtration require...

petition.parliament.uk

Important to understand the IPC “droplet is good enough” groupthink perpetuated by John Conly while at WHO…. Cost of N95s, fit testing, implications of saying it is AIRBORNE ie isolation requirements and negative pressure rooms, mistaken belief in efficacy of surg masks vs “perils” of N-95s….??

Barry Hunt@barryhunt008.bsky.social · 2y ago

But in the illogical world of BC IPC & PH, the hospital has changed from "Airborne Precautions" to "Droplet Precautions" for this patient Sigh 😔 😢

Avoiding infection requires an understanding of transmission…. most in medicine never really understood how respiratory pathogens transmitted. A ballistic droplet strategy was destined to fail. We now know the importance of aerosols in shared air and the futility of relying on hand washing.

Henry Madison@ragesheen.bsky.social · 3y ago

In the never-ending war of us vs pathogens, we’re astronomically outnumbered and always destined to lose. The best appraoch has always been to avoid infection, not to treat it.

COVID patients breathe large amounts of virus early on. "COVID patients exhale high numbers of virus during the first eight days after symptoms start, as high as 1,000 copies per minute, reports a new Northwestern Medicine study." Study: www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1...

COVID patients breathe large amounts of virus early on

Northwestern investigators collect samples over the entire course of infection to determine when a person is most infectious

news.northwestern.edu

“The great: Finally, an acknowledgment that short-range airborne transmission is an integral component of all (not just COVID) airborne transmission.” But WHO are still saying “direct deposition” or droplets for influenza? www.who.int/publications...

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Trish Greenhalgh@trishgreenhalgh.bsky.social · 2y ago

Want to catch up on the WHO paper on new terminology for airborne respiratory infections? Read this cracking blog by Joe Vipond 🧪 healthydebate.ca/2024/04/topi...