Getting the Russian Navy to spend limited resources and readiness on things like this is a smart choice. It’s also a good indication that they are on the back foot and in reactive mode.

auonsson@auonsson.bsky.social · 2mo ago

Trigger happy Russian frigate Admiral Grigorovich was spotted escorting a shadow tanker in the English Channel. The Times journalist @charliehparker.bsky.social filmed from a small fishing boat, seemingly without reaction, very close, assessed closer than the yacht fired upon. (low confidence)

Washington Post now reporting the Navy told Congress it will be months to clear “20 or so” mines laid by Iran, and that not until war is over. You simply cannot clear mines in an active war zone.

Mike Petersen@michaelbpetersen.bsky.social · 5mo ago

In 1991, it took a multi-national mine clearing task force of 40+ ships (plus aircraft) four months to clear Iraqi mines *after the war ended* and they knew where the mines were because they had the charts. Today, unmanned systems help, but the process is still extremely slow and dangerous. 1/

Russian vs. Chinese analysis on the Iran war: Russian analysts think that US talk of negotiations is a smoke screen for future ground operations and Chinese analysts think that hints of ground operations are designed to pressure Iran into negotiations.

We @fpri.bsky.social published insights from @salisbot.bsky.social @michaelbpetersen.bsky.social and Frank Hoffman about the challenges ahead for the US Navy as it considers how to take control of the Strait of Hormuz www.fpri.org/article/2026...

FPRI Experts React | Options in the Strait of Hormuz - Foreign Policy Research Institute

After weeks of war, pressure is mounting on the Trump administration to deploy sea and ground forces on an open-ended mission to reopen the Strait of Hormuz,

fpri.org

In 1991, it took a multi-national mine clearing task force of 40+ ships (plus aircraft) four months to clear Iraqi mines *after the war ended* and they knew where the mines were because they had the charts. Today, unmanned systems help, but the process is still extremely slow and dangerous. 1/

What intelligence is Russia giving Iran? It’s possible to speculate. Much will be space based imagery of various kinds. This is good for knowing what bases are being used when, and where aircraft may be parked. It can allow Iran to temporarily slow or halt airfield ops, or harass base personnel. 1/

Russia passing intelligence to Iran is challenging, but not game changing. Their ability to produce over the horizon dynamic targeting is limited. They can help with fixed targets, but moving targets are another thing entirely. And there’s the challenge of passing perishable intelligence to Iran.

The Iranian Navy was never really a threat. But IRGCN FAC/FIACs and unmanned surface vessels are going to be a problem if/when Navy ships head back into the Gulf. Hopefully, the IRGCN has taken the same beating as the actual Iranian Navy.

NOELREPORTS@noelreports.com · 5mo ago

Iran's navy is combat ineffective, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth declared alongside CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper. The operation continues decisively; Iran's hope that the US cannot sustain it is "a bad miscalculation of the IRGC," Hegseth said. #Iran

Lots of good stuff here. And where I explain why the submarine CO who sank Dena could not have done otherwise. It’s worth knowing facts, context, and feasibility in that conversation.

Aaron Stein@aaronstein1.bsky.social · 5mo ago

Experts from the @fpri.bsky.social analyze the latest military developments from the Third Gulf War @slair.bsky.social @dexeve.bsky.social @michaelbpetersen.bsky.social @salisbot.bsky.social & Guy Plopsky www.fpri.org/article/2026...

Folks, you know less than you think about how submarine warfare works. Take a knee on this one.

It is remarkable how little industry knows about the Navy and vice versa.

Shoe@shoe.bsky.social · 5mo ago

There goes that. It had a good 2 hour run.

In an odd confluence of social media arguments over professional military education and the Iran War, my old colleagues at the Naval War College have years of research showing how difficult it is to defeat Shahed attacks, something they’ve warned of for quite a long time.

A very important and welcome piece. Drones are dangerous. Their use is necessary. But maneuver, mission command, flexibility, and air power can mitigate impacts like those we see in Ukraine.

War on the Rocks@warontherocks.bsky.social · 6mo ago

When armies struggle to maneuver, new weapons tend to look decisive. That pattern is older than drones.

Lots of people going a few rounds on the other site over the war game sponsored by Die Welt. Won’t rehash the criticisms, but it’s always useful to remember that it’s just one single-pass war game. Its results aren’t dispositive and only reflect one possible outcome. That’s getting forgotten.

I’m thrilled join the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s (@fpri.bsky.social) Eurasia Program as a senior non-resident fellow, where I will be writing about Russian and European military and maritime power. Super stoked to rejoin my bud @emilyholland.bsky.social for critical work in a crucial time.

If the Russian Navy is increasing presence in the Baltic, this is a good thing in the long run. Burning readiness in response to NATO naval activity is a net loss. Increased operational tempo is more “expensive” for Russia than it is for NATO navies.

auonsson@auonsson.bsky.social · 8mo ago

Swedish navy confirms presence of Russian military staff on shadow fleet tankers in Baltic Sea. Further states that RU navy vessels have increased presence and believes it is partly to protect the shadow fleet. www.svt.se/nyheter/inri...

This is precisely what the Russians have been concerned about for years, and why they put so much intellectual emphasis on long-range precision strike.

Franz-Stefan Gady@hoanssolo.bsky.social · 8mo ago

Given the direction of stand-off precision-strike warfare we are heading toward, disentangling conventional deterrence from nuclear deterrence will become increasingly difficult.

I was very happy to talk about this with the Washington Post. There's quite a bit of hype about the Poseidon, but I'm not buying it. Gift article: wapo.st/3LiPswj

What we know about the Poseidon, Russia’s new super torpedo

Poseidon is part of Russia’s line up of “super weapons” meant to gain military parity with the West and it can supposedly drown coastal cities.

wapo.st

This is a reminder that a single Russian SSBN packs way more firepower than a Poseidon whatever-it-is.

One reason Russia has struggled so badly in UKR is the moribund state of Russian military operational art, which ensures tactical outcomes are linked to strategic goals. New CNA research with me, Paul Schwartz and @gabrielairosa.bsky.social shows how this is true. 1/2 www.cna.org/analyses/202...

Russian Concepts of Future Warfare Based on Lessons from the Ukraine War

This paper examines the evolution of military strategy and conventional operations over the Russia-Ukraine War.

cna.org

We first met when he was a 1-star at Naval Forces Europe and have crossed paths quite frequently since. It’s not my job to blindly cheer on the Navy, but he’s a great choice; smart, demanding, creative, take-no-prisoners. He’ll work his staff hard, but he’ll also get results.

U.S. Naval Institute@usni.org · last yr.

BREAKING: Fleet Forces Commander Caudle Nominated as Next Chief of Naval Operations — USNI News news.usni.org/2025/06/18/f...

Detailed article quoting 🇬🇧 UK defence sources on 🇷🇺 Russia's undersea warfare, surveillance and maritime sabotage activities near Britain. Some highlights: a 🧵 1) 🇷🇺 Russian ASW sensors suspected of attempting to spy on the UK’s nuclear submarines have been found hidden in the seas around Britain.

Revealed: Putin’s secret war in UK waters

Russian sensors trying to track nuclear submarines have been found in a campaign of ‘greyzone’ warfare that also targets our energy and internet. Even oligarchs’ superyachts are in on it

thetimes.com

A thoughtful thread worth a read. I might quibble on Russian submarine missions, but the larger point holds. And there are theater-wide implications beyond Norway. The Barents can be a key staging area for long-range attacks into the UK and Iceland. Adds to importance of UK/Norway partnership.

Ina Holst-Pedersen Kvam@inahpkvam.bsky.social · last yr.

In the discussion of how 'America First' might affect US-Norwegian defence cooperation along NATO's northern flank moving forward, a credible threat assessment is an absolute minimum. Instead, overly simplified evaluations of the nature and character of the Russian threat dominate discourse 🧵

I’ve known ADM Franchetti since she took command of Sixth Fleet. We worked some hard warfighting problems together and it was a huge honor to be a part of her team when she became CNO.

This is one of my go-to’s in the face of the “just buy drones” crowd. A TLAM is, warhead-pound-per-dollar, already more cost effective than a Shahed, not even counting the guidance system, survivability, and modular deployability advantages. Drones are good but not perfect.

David Burbach 🇺🇸@dburbach.bsky.social · last yr.

Impressive, a Tomahawk is already more than 1/3 warhead by mass (1000lb explosive, 2900 lb gross wt). You can not get order of magnitude performance increases shrinkifying the propulsion, guidance, airframe for same damage. Some new-physics propulsion method, OK, but no one is claiming that.

Asked if Russia would be allowed to maintain its naval port at Tartus and the Hmeimim air base in Latakia, Abu Qasra said: “If we get benefits for Syria out of this, yes.” www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/0...

Syria could allow Russia to keep its bases, new defense minister says

In an interview, Murhaf Abu Qasra, a onetime leader in Syria’s insurgency, discussed moves by authorities in Damascus to build new alliances.

washingtonpost.com

Mike Petersen@michaelbpetersen.bsky.social · 2y ago

One possible outcome among many here is a renegotiated basing agreement that has more balanced terms than the one currently in effect.

I won’t take sides in this argument, but the bottom line is that no matter what the reason for this latest incident, Russia’s dark fleet is a significant danger in the maritime environment and requires more thoroughgoing and permanent policy solutions beyond stationing naval vessels in the Baltic.

I’ve made this argument before but it bears repeating based on the latest ceasefire new: if CENTCOM’s strategic objectives in the Red Sea include the restoration of white shipping, you have to understand that corporate incentives are not neatly aligned towards a quick return to the Suez route.

I was Halsey Alfa faculty for a year before setting up a similar program for Russia. Hands down, Halsey Alfa is *the* premier US/China warfighting analytic and educational program in the US Navy. It goes far, far beyond any other China warfighting analysis in the world. There’s nothing like it.

Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC)@cimsec.bsky.social · 2y ago

Building Warfighting Competence: The Halsey Alfa Wargaming Experience Anthony LaVolpa discusses the Halsey Alfa program and impacts to his understanding of wargaming operations, tactic, and strategies.