Julien Lie-Panis

@jliep.bsky.social

I study the psychology of large-scale cooperation: how human minds give rise to the rules, norms, and institutions that make societies possible. https://jliep.github.io/

🚨 PNAS paper: "Indirect reciprocity undermines indirect reciprocity destabilizing large-scale cooperation" w/ Eric Schnell How do we achieve global cooperation on climate or conflict reduction? The problem isn't selfishness as much as it is cooperation itself - at a smaller scale. 1/

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🍄 New paper out in PLOS Computational Biology! 🍄 I, and others, have previously drawn a comparison between the classic “cost-avoidance” argument for social learning and the central idea of resource rationality... (1/8)

1/4 In today's funding climate, every grant and fellowship matters. Based on feedback from our GSAC Community Check-In Survey, we're building a growing hub of graduate & postdoctoral funding opportunities and job boards to make them easier to find. 🧵

Funding and job board curated by Dieter Lukas and Pro Manna

Want to do a PhD to work on models of opinion dynamics and the inequalities of information flow, with an emphasis on climate change and climate policy? Apply by October 15 to work with Ago Merico and myself, based at @leibniz-zmt.de in Bremen, Germany. www.leibniz-zmt.de/en/vacancies...

Doctoral candidate (gn) - WG Systems Ecology

Das Leibniz-Zentrum für Marine Tropenforschung (ZMT) erforscht tropische und subtropische Küstenökosysteme und ihre Bedeutung für Natur und Menschen erforscht.

leibniz-zmt.de

Why do societies rely on rigid moral rules? Don't lie. Keep your promises. Don't steal. We all recognize there are good reasons to make exceptions. So why are moral rules so often categorical? Our new paper proposes an answer. 🧵

Screenshot of article title page, "Why human societies adopt rigid moral rules"

"Modern life looks strange not because it escaped our evolutionary past, but because it multiplies the means through which ancient motivations can be expressed. The surface complexity seems culturally specific. The underlying, ultimate logic is not."

Ultimate motivations and the strange things we do every day

Why modern behavior looks evolutionarily strange. And why it isn’t. A framework for reconnecting everyday cultural practices to the ultimate motivations that make them matter.

edgardubourg.substack.com

Hey all! Been away from BSky for a while but this Friday I am giving a talk on our latest PNAS Nexus paper on repeated games! We model situations where players, instead of acting simultaneously, act in order. We study the status of well-known equilibrium strategies when simultaneity is broken.

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academic.oup.com

Simon Columbus@simoncolumbus.bsky.social · 4mo ago

This week's Cooperation Colloquium: Saptarshi Pal (Harvard) From simultaneous to leader-follower play in direct reciprocity Date: April 10 Time: 15:00 UTC+2 (Vienna) / 9am ET (NYC) Sign up here: list.ku.dk/postorius/li...

Abstract: Repeated interaction is a key mechanism driving the evolution of cooperation, generosity, extortion, and other social behaviors. These behaviors are typically studied using two-player repeated games, where the two players act simultaneously in every round. In this paper, we begin with a standard two-action repeated game, but transform it into a leader–follower game. We do this by forcing one player to indicate their impending move, or to openly commit first in each round. We show that this simple transformation provides new and useful analytical insights. In particular, we use this transformation to derive expressions for the main classes of simultaneous-move Nash equilibria of memory-1, when payoffs are discounted. We show that these equilibria also remain stable under the leader–follower structure. We prove that this reassuring property does not always extend to games with more than two actions or to equilibrium strategies with longer memory. Overall, we establish a novel connection between repeated simultaneous-move games and repeated leader–follower games in evolutionary game theory. This approach offers fruitful means of investigating how prediction and anticipation play a role in stable social behavior.