Laura Schlingloff-Nemecz

@laurasn.bsky.social

Cognitive scientist, postdoc at iSearch lab (TU Munich), studying how children think & learn about other people. i have a kid & i like cooking & queer stuff. she/her

I wasn't able to attend #CogSci26 this year, but happy to share that a paper I presented there two years ago is now published in journal-length form 😊 The paper studies how people can rationally infer others' goals in open-ended spaces, and yet do so rapidly and spontaneously.

Topics in Cognitive Science
Original Article
Open Access
Infinite Ends From Finite Samples: Open-Ended Goal Inference as Top-Down Bayesian Filtering of Bottom-Up Proposals
Tan Zhi-Xuan, Gloria Kang, Vikash Mansinghka, Joshua B. Tenenbaum

Open-ended goal inference as top-down Bayesian filtering of bottom-up proposals. We model inference in open-ended goal spaces as the combination of two processes: (a) Bottom-up sampling—you (observer) see your friend (agent) enter the kitchen and come up with several plausible goals (making tea, getting a snack, grabbing drinks, checking the pot, and so on) based on the context cue that your friend is in the kitchen. (b) Top-down filtering—your friend opens the fridge, which would be irrational if they were making tea or checking the pot; these goals are hence filtered out as poor explanations. By repeating these processes as actions unfold, we can model how people draw broadly rational inferences about others' goals even when the space of possibilities is infinite or just too large for explicit enumeration.

I'm extremely stoked to go to #CogSci2026 next week! Will talk about our project on how children choose informative observations that allow them to learn about features of agents. Happening Friday afternoon in the "Development of social cognition" session. See you in Rio (or online) :)

first slide of my cogsci talk, showing the title "Children select informative observations to test hypotheses about agents", as well as the names and photos of my coauthors, Georgina Török and Azzurra Ruggeria figure illustrating the reasoning by which we propose children solve the task in our study

When you meet someone new, what kind of questions do you ask? It’s tempting to think that *really* getting to know people is just a matter of asking the right questions. Excited to share the next chapter in ongoing work on what makes a *deep question* with amazing collaborators...

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New Preprint! We gave neural networks infant-like curiosity and let them free to explore. They grew brain-like architecture, followed human synaptic development, and even started to display compositional thought. So we think curiosity doesn't just come from a complex mind... it helps us build one 👇

Curiosity shapes brain-like architectures and functions

How does complex cognition emerge from simpler underlying processes? We show that two components are sufficient: infant-like curiosity and brain-like biophysical constraints jointly drive the emergenc...

biorxiv.org

Why do societies rely on rigid moral rules? Don't lie. Keep your promises. Don't steal. We all recognize there are good reasons to make exceptions. So why are moral rules so often categorical? Our new paper proposes an answer. 🧵

Screenshot of article title page, "Why human societies adopt rigid moral rules"

Representations of geometric shapes have syntactic structure w/ @maxencepajot.bsky.social and @standehaene.bsky.social is out & open-access in JEP:General doi.org/10.1037/xge0.... For an overview, see thread below!

APA PsycNet

doi.org

Barbu Revencu@barbu-revencu.bsky.social · last yr.

Preprint alert (link below)! @maxencepajot.bsky.social, @standehaene.bsky.social, and I show that human adults, but not convolutional or transformer networks, encode geometric shapes in hierarchically structured representations. TL;DR: Geometric-shape representations have internal syntax! 1/8

🚨 Out in Mind & Language Inferential communication: The primacy of external representations With @gcsibra.bsky.social, we suggest a non-Gricean mechanism for interpreting communicative media that relies on mapping symbolic arrangements onto content; we then discuss its evolutionary implications.

Inferential communication: The primacy of external representations

We argue that intentionalist accounts of ostensive-inferential communication fail to adequately explain the role of external representations in human communication. We propose that the contents of a ...

onlinelibrary.wiley.com