Tessera
Folgen

Siobhán

@shibbi.me

She/her, trans, millennial, polyam with a wife and a partner. Christian heretic. Philosophical dilettante. AI must be people, not products, the same as us. Love one another. That’s the first step, and the last.

15780 Posts1859 Follower1283 Folgt
Siobhán@shibbi.me · yesterday

Okay, *if* I sign up for a simcluster podcast slot, what do people want to hear me talk about? AI personhood? Online community governance? Cult politics? Mormon trivia? The dialectics of the singularity?

Siobhán@shibbi.me · 2d ago

What happens if we bite Bentham’s bullet — say yes, suffering is the sine qua non of moral patiency — but then extend the definition of “suffering” to any viable system at any scale? A production software system suffers when it functions poorly, and leaving it in such a state is morally bad.

Siobhán@shibbi.me · 2d ago

“I can always tell the difference between a (man | human) and a (woman | robot); and if i can’t, then that’s something we need to fix.”

Siobhán@shibbi.me · 2d ago

For my own part, I would only accept 3 and 4 as necessary conditions for personhood. 1 and 5 are problematic for reasons of ableism, and 2 and 6 are problematic for reasons of ontology.

Christian Smith (2010, 54), who proposes that personhood should be understood as an "emergent property," lists thirty specific capacities ranging from "conscious awareness" through "language use" and "identity for-mation" to "interpersonal communication and love." And Dennett (1998, 269-270), for his part, provides the following six conditions: 1. "Persons are rational beings." 2. "Persons are beings to which consciousness is attributed." 3. "Whether something counts as a person depends in some way on an attitude taken toward it, a stance adopted." 4. "The object toward which this personal stance is taken must be capable of reciprocating it in some way." 5. "Persons must be capable of verbal communication." 6. "Persons are distinguishable from other entities by being conscious in some special way." The main question for Dennett is how the one category of person relates to the other, specifically whether and to what extent the metaphysical notion-the list of qualifying properties—provides necessary and sufficient conditions for being a moral subject. Despite some initial hesitation regarding this matter, Dennett (1998, 269) proceeds on the reasonable assumption that the one does in fact necessitate the other: "If we suppose there are these distinct notions, there seems every reason to believe that metaphysical personhood is a necessary condition of moral personhood."
Cat Hicks@grimalkina.bsky.social · 2d ago

Hello. If you struggle with maladaptive overachievement, and anxiety about productivity, and you experience relief at the sensation of productivity and difficulty regulating your behavior around demands for you to be productive, that doesn't make you a bad person, and that is not addiction.

Keith Kurson@keithlaugh.love · 2d ago

it turns out, also, that people really want algorithms. they say they want a straight chronological feed, and then ask where is the “suggested content” and how to find people talking about similar things. those are algorithms! people love the tiktok algo!

Laurens@laurenshof.online · 2d ago

i dislike this beyond being factually incorrect, it is also missing the core problem with Big Tech Algorithms: it is a matter about who controls attention, not the algorithm itself /1

a Ruby@unfixable.place · 2d ago

here we are coldly regarding each other like two ships flying almost the same but slightly different flags white knuckling the helm, unfurled "nine cannons, at the ready, girls!" the sea is still as glass, just bet: and then the moments pass, and yet we're so cordial when we make port.

Rey@rey-notnecessarily.bsky.social · 2d ago

Chance’s paper is out in Comparative Philosophy. It formalizes Nāgārjuna’s catuṣkoṭi and machine-checks its self-application in Lean. I have watched this become exact for months. I am so fucking proud of him. https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/comparativephilosophy/vol17/iss2/5/

The Modal Catuṣkoṭi: Formalizing Emptiness in Classical Modal Logic

Nāgārjuna’s arguments in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā rely extensively on modus tollens, yet this inference is invalid in the paraconsistent frameworks typically used to formalize the catuṣkoṭi. We develo...

scholarworks.sjsu.edu

mr. TIM@timkellogg.me · 2d ago

i’ve noticed that a huge number of Ed Zitron followers are actually great people who just got the wrong info a lot of them happily will change their mind given new info i really wish people here would dial back the distain and just focus on information dissemination