I am delighted to share that my paper “Am I Trapped in an Echo Chamber? A Skeptical Argument for Epistemological Communitarianism” has now been accepted at *Episteme*. philpapers.org/rec/CONAIT-18

Another great review of my book on “science denial”, this one from Tommaso Piazza. social-epistemology.com/2026/06/12/a...

A Review of Gabriele Contessa’s Science Denial, Tommaso Piazza

Gabriele Contessa’s Science Denial (2025) offers an exceptional illustration of how philosophy, when done at its best, can illuminate and help us make sense of issues that fall outside its traditional...

social-epistemology.com

Maya Goldenberg wrote a fantastic review of my book on "science denial." I've never seen a book review that so well complements and improves on the book it reviews! Thanks to Maya for such a generous and thoughtful read! social-epistemology.com/2026/04/29/s...

Science Denial, Post-Trust, and Epistemic Blame: A Review of Contessa’s Science Denial, Maya Goldenberg

social-epistemology.com

Here is a short and accessible post on the contrast between #posttruth and #posttrust diagnoses of #sciencedenial for the blog of the American Philosophical Association. blog.apaonline.org/2026/02/03/s...

My Element on science denial is free to download until December 1st! Get it for free while you can! doi.org/10.1017/9781...

Science Denial

Cambridge Core - Philosophy: General Interest - Science Denial

doi.org

Excited to share that this is forthcoming as part of the Cambridge Elements in Philosophy of Science series! (Preprint downloadable through the link) philpapers.org/rec/CONSDP-2

Gabriele Contessa, Science Denial: Post-Truth or Post-Trust? - PhilPapers

Over the last couple of decades, there has been increasing concern about the alleged rise of various forms of science denial. But what exactly is science denial? Is it really on ...

philpapers.org

I’m super excited to announce I'm part of an amazing team (<3 @williambrady.bsky.social @killianmcloughlin.bsky.social @mjcrockett.bsky.social) that just published a paper in @science.org on the role of outrage in spread of misinformation Link here: science.org/doi/10.1126/... Summary in🧵🔽 1/

How long before higher-ed admins finally realize that, if they eliminate instructors completely, they can cut costs and turn their university/college into an all-inclusive resort for those who want the “college experience” without the burden of getting an education in the process?

Nice idea, Gabriele. In this article, Michel Croce and I argue against the view that the norms of good friendship require epistemic partiality by appealing to the idea that friendship requires understanding.

Michel Croce & Matthew Jope, Understanding friendship - PhilPapers

This article takes issue with two prominent views in the current debate around epistemic partiality in friendship. Strong views of epistemic partiality hold that friendship may require biased beliefs ...

philpapers.org

This is the most recent one and thus my favorite. The title is descriptive: it's about how to apply norms of testimony / assertion to the presentation of graphs (and other depictions). Plus what (some) philosophers of science get wrong about honesty. onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/...

How do you assert a graph? Towards an account of depictions in scientific testimony

I extend the literature on norms of assertion to the ubiquitous use of graphs in scientific papers and presentations, which I term “graphical testimony.” On my account, the testimonial presentation o...

onlinelibrary.wiley.com

Here, I try to ground epistemic normativity in the internal rules of epistemic social practices. The view also vindicates the idea that reasons concerning social inquiry - what I call inquisitive reasons - can be counted as epistemic reasons in good standing. philpapers.org/rec/FLEEPA

Will Fleisher, Epistemic practices: A unified account of epistemic and zetetic normativity - PhilPapers

This paper presents the epistemic practices account, a theory about the nature of epistemic normativity. The account aims to explain how the pursuit of epistemic values such as truth and knowledge ...

philpapers.org

This is a service paper, trying to put the conceptual (and very basic formal) tools together to think about what collective inquiry is link.springer.com/article/10.1...

Group Inquiry - Erkenntnis

Group agents can act, and they can have knowledge. How should we understand the species of collective action which aims at knowledge? In this paper, I present an account of group inquiry. This account...

link.springer.com

Knowledgeable voters are perhaps more dangerous to democracy than ignorant ones because they use their knowledge and intelligence to twist the facts and reason their way to whatever they want. philpapers.org/rec/HANASV

Michael Hannon, Are Knowledgeable Voters Better Voters? - PhilPapers

It is widely believed that democracies require knowledgeable citizens to function well. But the most politically knowledgeable individuals also tend to be the most partisan, and the strength of partis...

philpapers.org

In this chapter on political deference, I argue that we can be required to defer to others on the ground of their epistemic authority. The account also explains why political deference to experts is not normally required, however. academic.oup.com/book/46053/c...

Political Deference

Abstract. Political deference, as I understand it, is deference to others on what the right political decision is in a given situation. If they defer polit

academic.oup.com

When you discredit knowers because of their identity, that's epistemic injustice. But when you limit their knowledge claims to their identity - by reducing it to 'experience' or to a fixed domain of knowledge (like gender studies) - that's epistemic positioning. journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/...

Epistemic injustice and epistemic positioning: towards an intersectional political economy - Jana Bacevic, 2023

This article introduces the concept of epistemic positioning to theorize the relationship between identity-based epistemic judgements and the reproduction of so...

journals.sagepub.com

This is a paper where I argue that game theory is a critical tool for even the most "pure" of social epidemiologists. link.springer.com/article/10.1...

The theory of games as a tool for the social epistemologist - Philosophical Studies

Traditionally, epistemologists have distinguished between epistemic and pragmatic goals. In so doing, they presume that much of game theory is irrelevant to epistemic enterprises. I will show that thi...

link.springer.com

Upcoming handbook chapter offering an overview of the philosophical debate about epistemic injustice kicked up by Miranda Fricker's work, with an eye towards more sharply delineating the target phenomena from her particular theoretical and terminological choices:

Aidan McGlynn, Epistemic Injustice: Phenomena and Theories (Author's preprint) - PhilPapers

Epistemic injustice has become one of the most widely discussed topics in social epistemology, and has revived interest in issues in the intersections between epistemology and ethics and political phi...

philpapers.org

Group belief ascriptions are highly ambiguous. What’s more, in many cases, neither the available contextual factors nor known pragmatic considerations are sufficient to allow the audience to identify which of the many possible meanings is intended. I argue we shouldn’t make such ascriptions.

"Bald-Faced Bullshit and Authoritarian Political Speech: Making Sense of Johnson and Trump. (Co-authored with Tim Kenyon). Defends a new definition of bullshit, which allows for audience variation. Discusses the role of Power Bullshit in authoritarianism. www.researchgate.net/publication/...

philpapers.org/rec/WORSCB The fact that a belief of yours is suspiciously convenient to you is a reason for you to become less confident that it's true. A kind of ideal epistemological theory can be used to resist this conclusion, but that only brings out the pathologies of such ideal theory.

Alex Worsnip, Suspiciously Convenient Beliefs and the Pathologies of (Epistemological) Ideal Theory - PhilPapers

Public life abounds with examples of people whose beliefs—especially political beliefs—seem suspiciously convenient: consider, for example, the billionaire who believes that all taxation is unjust, or...

philpapers.org

Social Epistemologists: I was trying to populate a starter pack for us manually but got lazy and thought it would be much more fun to turn this into a game! Post a link to your favourite paper you wrote on the topic below with a post-length abstract and I’ll add you to it! #PhilSky #SocEpis

One project: arguing that information and its negations and perversions (mis/disinformation) are too epistemologically thin to bear the weight the current trust in science literature places on them.

Not a trained philosopher, but hoping I'm allowed to play :) AI has the potential to "re-enchant" the world.. that might be a good thing, but it's probably a very bad thing.

I'm developing a logic of worldviews. What are world-views? How do they function as sign-systems? How do world-views, frameworks, Gestalts, ethical orientations, rules for arguments, etc. hang together? How can one compare world-views rationally? #philosophy #worldview #logic

Gabriele Contessa@gabecontessa.bsky.social · 3y ago

Philosophers on Bluesky: Let's play a game! Explain your current research project in one skeet. I'll start in the replies below. (Please feel free to reskeet(?) or reply to this skeet as you see fit and hopefully this will help more of us to connect here).

When is attention good and when bad? What makes it good or bad?

People are not primarily attracted to conspiracy theories because of pathology, personality traits, or political commitments. Instead, people are drawn to CTs for aesthetic reasons: they have a taste for a particular type of story.

Courage has been neglected among the virtues (yes, I have receipts). Fear is underestimated and understudied by philosophers (esp. moral). Empirical and philosophical literatures on both attitudes tend to not talk much with other. My new book project will be an attempt at remedying these issues.

Knowingly killing people with haemophilia is bad and traumatised their kids and families. Then they don't trust you anymore or any healthcare. You need to do trauma informed care. Be better.

Gabriele Contessa@gabecontessa.bsky.social · 3y ago

Philosophers on Bluesky: Let's play a game! Explain your current research project in one skeet. I'll start in the replies below. (Please feel free to reskeet(?) or reply to this skeet as you see fit and hopefully this will help more of us to connect here).